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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Financial intermediation is one of the most heavily regulated activities 
in the economy. The existence and the design of the regulation which 
affects financial intermediaries and, more particularly, credit 
institutions ( L e. banks and savings banks) is a topic of intense 
debate. Apart form regulations related to the role of banks in the 
determination of the quantity of money and the operation of monetary 
policy, all countries have an important body of prudential regulation 
which submits credit institutions to numerous controls and restrictions, 
from licensing to capital standards, limits on risk-taking, supervision, 
closure rules and many others. The special preoccupation with solvency 
is the most distinctive feature of the prudential regulation of banks as 
compared with the regulation of other firms. 
In the U.S. , the safety net created after the Great Depression 
appeared to work remarkably well during nearly fifty years. Bank 
failures decreased from 4,000 in 1933 to 370 during the period 1934 
through 1941 and declined still further from 1942 through 1980, with a 
total number of 198. This situation changed dramatically in the late 
1970s and the 1980s. The failure of hundreds of savings and loan 
institutions caused the insolvency and reorganization of the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. There were also many banks in 
trouble -in Texas, for example, nine of the ten largest bank holding 
companies were reorganized with public or outside assistance-. From 
1987 through the end of 1990, the fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation declined from over $18 billion to approximately $9 billion 
(U.S.  Department of the Treasury, 1991) .  
These facts have provided a powerful impetus for regulatory reform 
in the U.S. banking industry. Academics have broadly participated in the 
debate. Criticisms against the over-extended and risk-insensitive 
deposit insurance system have been predominant. It has also been argued 
that some old rules designated to protect banks from competition, such 
as limits on branching and interest rate ceilings, became barriers that 
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prevented banks from adapting to new market conditions, thereby 
stimulating disintermediation and the loss of the banks' best customers. 
Although financial crises have affected also European banking 
systems in the recent past -the Spanish banking system among them-, the 
debate on banking reform in the European Community (EC) has focused on 
the need for harmonization within an increasingly integrated Europe. The 
urgency of adapting very heterogeneous national regulatory system to the 
immediate liberalization of capital movements and the future competition 
of European credit institutions in a single market, has stimulated the 
dismantling of very rigid and complex regulations. 
The difficulties in the harmonization process are mainly due to two 
reasons. First, the differences in the structure of the national 
financial sectors and, hence, in the roles played by banks in each 
country. Second, the priority given to monetary aspects, reflected' in 
the design of the European System of Central Banks (see Chiappori et al, 
1991 ) .  Nevertheless, some important fruits have been obtained, including 
the Second Banking Directive and the directives on own funds and 
solvency ratios. 
At the world level, the increasing importance of international 
banking has also forced coordination. The most remarkable example is the 
1988 Basle Accord on capital standards. This agreement set out the basis 
on which risk-weighted capital requirements should be determined, and 
inspired closely related directives by the EC one year later. 
Despite its importance, the regulation of credit institutions has 
generated few theoretical developments. The literature is abundant, but 
dispersed and incomplete. The objective of this thesis is to provide a 
better understanding of the economic effects of prudential regulation. 
It does not deal with the design of the optimal regulation (a normative 
approach) but with the analysis of current regulatory devices and 
realistic proposals for reform (a positive approach) .  Still, neither the 
political process by which  regulation is conceived nor the behavior of 
the agencies in charge of enforcing that regulation are examined in this 
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thesis. 
Of course, incorporating the maximizing behavior of regulators and 
supervisors into the analysis would make it more complete, but at the 
cost of greater complexity. Generally, the advance of applied economic 
theory requires abstracting some points to concentrate  in others. 
Banking regulation, in particular, is a wide and non-mature research 
field and focusing on a relatively small set of issues is obliged. 
Notwithstanding, the scope of this thesis is not capricious. On the 
one hand, a good comprehension of the responses of economic agents to 
the introduction and reform of regulatory restrictions is a first step 
to provide a basis for both the welfare analysis and the political 
economy of banking regUlation. On the other, the economics of bank 
behavior is relatively unexplored and can be enriched with concepts and 
methods already applied in other areas of economic theoTY' 
Most economists accept the existence of several market 
imperfections which are closely related to the very nature of the 
banking activity. These imperfections provide a rationale for regulation 
although its final convenience should depend on comparing the gains from 
public intervention with the deadweight losses generated by agency costs 
and possibly distorting policy instruments. 
First, modern theories of financial intermediation rely on 
informational problems. Asymmetric information is a characteristic of 
the relationship between borrowers and lenders. According to Diamond 
( 1984) ,  fixed costs linked to information acquisition together with 
diversification can justify why screening and monitoring are delegated 
by lenders to an intermediary. However, asymmetric information is also a 
characteristic of the relationship between the bank and its depositors, 
and may potentially counterbalance part of the economic gains derived 
from intermediation. Small depositors in particular have neither the 
incentives nor, probably, the competence to evaluate and monitor the 
quality and behavior of banks, and can be especially exposed to adverse 
selection and moral hazard phenomena. 
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Second, demand deposits may provide insurance services to 
depositors in a multi-period setting where they are subject to 
individual uncertainty on their liquidity needs but available investment 
projects are illiquid (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .  However, depositors' 
reactions to adverse information or beliefs on investment outcomes (and 
not only their response to genuine liquidity needs ) take the form of 
deposit withdrawals, so costly bank runs may occur, even as a result of 
self -fulfilling expectations. 
Third, given the links between financial institutions in financial 
and monetary markets, negative externalities associated to bank failures 
may exist (Goodhart, 1987) .  
The traditional goals of banking regulation are clearly related to 
these problems. Depositor protection, on the one hand, entails 
establishing rules in order to preserve or enhance the quality of 
financial services. Financial stability, on the other, demands limiting 
the incidence of bank failures and, in particular, avoiding bank panics, 
that may lead to failures even when the banks involved are initially 
solvent. 
In most countries prudential regulation consists of combining 
implicit or explicit deposit guarantees and lender of last resort 
facilities with a variety of constraints on bank behavior, notably, 
limits on leverage, asset risk and off -balance sheet exposures. As a 
complement, supervisory agencies monitor the conduct and solvency of 
banks by submiting the institutions to repporting obligations, on-site 
examinations and sanctions. 
In this context, deposit insurance can be thought of as a mean by 
which, on the one hand, depositors delegate the role of monitoring and 
disciplining banks to the banking authorities and, on the other, 
incentives for early withdrawal on a purely precautionary basis are 
removed. Accordingly, the regulatory problem could be explained in the 
following terms: since the risks of loss are transferred from depositors 
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to the deposit insurance agency (DIA) ,  regulation (as opposed to the 
market) has to undertake the role of disciplining banks. 
Deposit insurance, however, creates a moral hazard problem, since 
the insurer bears most of the losses in the event of failure, while the 
risk-taker obtains the rewards in· the event of success. In some sense, 
the problem faced by the insurer of bank deposits is akin to that of the 
creditor of an indebted corporation, who faces a bankruptcy risk. But 
some differences exist. First, the DIA is a public agency that, when 
dealing with the creditor (Le.  the bank) substitutes regulatory rules 
for the clauses in a private contract. Second, informational asymmetries 
and the economic consequences of failures are qualitative and 
quatitatively more important in banking than in other economic 
activities. 
In the literature on banking regulation, several strands can be 
distinguished. 
First, standard portfolio selection models have been used to 
analyze the impact of capital requirements on bank behavior. These is 
the case of well-known papers by Kahane ( 1977) ,  Koehn and Santomero 
( 1980) and Kim and Santomero ( 1988 ) ,  which follow Hart and Jaffee ( 1974) 
in modeling the bank as a risk-averse owner-manager. In that setup, 
however, investors are fully liable -bankruptcy does not exist- and 
both banks and their regulation lack clear economic justification. The 
incentives for a bank to take risk are just those of an ordinary 
risk-averse investor, except if some ad hoc assumption on the ( low) 
degree of risk aversion by the intermediary is made. Thus, regulatory 
rules introduce additional constraints in the portfolio problem and bank 
decisions are distorted in exchange of no clear economic gain. 
In such mean-variance framework, more stringent bank capital 
regulation (which reduces the risk associated with leverage) may cause 
the utility maximizing bank owner-manager to increase asset risk in 
order to compensate for the fall in the desired level of total portfolio 
risk. In some situations final portfolio risk may be even higher than 
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without regulation. 
Neglecting limited liability when dealing with prudential issues 
-which are closely related to insolvency risk- has been recently 
criticized by Keeley and Furlong (1990) .  The problem of incorporating 
limited liability in portfolio selection models is partially addressed 
by Rochet ( 1992) ,  although his treatment of short-sales (which are not 
discarded) and the exogeneity of bank capital (which is not a decision 
variable for banks) are not very satisfactory. 
Second, option theorists have remarked the isomorphic relationship 
between options and a variety of very common financial arrangements slJ.ch 
as corporate liabilities and loan guarantees. Following Black and 
Scholes ( 1973) ,  equity can be seen as a call option on the assets of the 
firm with an exercise price equal to the nominal value of debt. 
Shareholders exercise their right to buy the assets when the firm's net 
worth is positive; otherwise, limited liability provisions apply and 
bankruptcy is declared. Similarly, when corporate debt is subject to 
credit risk, the payments which are not realized in the even of failure 
can be assimilated to the losses of the issuer of a put option on the 
assets of the firm with an exercise price that, again, is equal to the 
nominal value of debt. 
Along these lines, as first noted by Merton ( 1977) ,  if deposits are 
fully insured, the deposit insurance agency can be considered as the 
writer of a put option on bank assets with a strike price equal to the 
promised maturity value of deposits. The put option is sold to bank 
shareholders in exchange of a deposit insurance premium and the 
submission of the bank to capital and asset regulations. This put option 
represents essencially the limited liability of bankers. 
Although this put is also implicit in standard debt contracts, what 
makes a difference in this case is the separation between the seller of 
the put (the DIA) and the holder of the debt contract (the depositors) :  
credit risk falls on the insurer. In contrast with ordinary lenders, 
depositors do not demand higher rates of interest to less solvent banks, 
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except if bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings cause them some 
inconveniences, such as delay in reimbursement. Thus, market discipline 
is not exerted at all. 
Merton's contribution suggested that, with an adequate valuation of 
the deposit insurance contract, the regulator could replace market 
discipline by actuarially fair deposit insurance premiums, i. e. premiums 
directly related to the discounted expected costs of bankruptcy to the 
DIA. Henceforth, most efforts have been devoted to obtain formulas for 
pricing deposit guarantees in different (and increasingly complex) 
environments (Merton, 1978; Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery, 1991; Allen 
and Saunders, 1993; Kerfriden and Rochet, 1993 ) ,  and to test the 
actuarial fairness of the flat-rate premiums currently applied (Marcus 
and Shaked, 1984; Ronn and Verma, 1986; and many others) .  
In this literature, perfect information by the insurer is 
implicitly assumed and the use of fair deposit insurance premiums is 
conceived as a feasible way to solve the regulatory problem. 
Surprisingly, little effort has been made in justifying the purposed 
pricing schemes within models that explicitly formalize the behavior of 
banks. Discussion is limited in many cases to point out that in the 
absence of a proper pricing of deposit guarantees, banks will have an 
incentive for excessive risk-taking, because the value of the put option 
representing limited liability is increasing in leverage and asset risk 
(Furlong and Keeley, 1989). 
Moreover, banking regulation might play a role in neutralizing 
these distortions or, at least in ameliorating their effects on the 
solvency of banks and the exposure of the deposit insurance system. But, 
in spite of having closed-form formulas for the valuation of the claims 
involved, this literature has paid small attention to realistic schemes 
such as ordinary capital requirements, limits on asset risk and the 
recently introduced risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios. 
With few exceptions, the effects of banking regulation on the 
behavior of banks have been analyzed in partial equilibrium settings 
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where competitive intermediaries invest in marketable assets whose 
prices are exogenously given. Neither the role of banks in financing 
real investment projects, nor general equilibrium issues, nor dynamic 
considerations related with bankruptcy and closure, nor the interaction 
between market power and risk-taking have been formally addressed. 
Finally, some authors have recently focused their attention towards 
the design of optimal banking regulation: Pecchenino, 1992; Chan et aL, 
1992; Bensaid et aL, 1993; Freixas y Gabillon, 1993. All of them 
coincide in explicitly dealing with informational asymmetries, but 
differ in the conception of banks, the assignment of economic value to 
banking activities, the definition of the regulator's objective function 
and some other details. These differences reflect the lack of a commonly 
accepted way to model the banking firm and its role in the economy, 
especially when the interest is centered on prudential issues. 
The economic analysis of banking regulation can be enriched if the 
virtues of each of these strands of the literature are put together. In 
particular, this thesis applies the option valuation formulas which are 
typically used in the second strand in order to derive the objective 
function of banks under limited liability. On this basis, the effects of 
prudential regulation on bank behavior can be rigorously examined, 
providing the foundations to extend the analysis in the directions 
suggested by our critical review of the literature. 
Although our treatment of limited liability is free from the 
critique to portfolio selection models, this thesis is not a 
re-statement of the mean-variance analysis of banking regulation, since 
the complexity of the problem in hand. recommends focusing on the case 
where bankers are risk-neutral. 
Limited liability introduces non-convexities in the bank' s 
optimization problem, since bankers posses a residual claim on the 
bank' s portfolio that yields positive rewards only in the upper tail of 
the distribution of the bank's net worth. If risk-aversion were 
introduced, the concavity of the corresponding expected utility function 
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could partially off -set the effects of the convexity in bankers' 
payoffs.  But the final results would depend on the degree of 
risk-aversion. Presumably, for moderate degrees of risk-aversion, bank 
behavior would be biased towards risk as in the risk-neutral case 
analyzed in this thesis. 
The content of the remaining chapters can be summarized as follows. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the behavior of perfectly competitive banks in a 
partial equilibrium setting. It contains the main elements upon which 
banks are modeled in successive chapters. Different types of regulation 
are examined, from the risk-based proposals to the risk-insensitive 
schemes that exist in many countries. The role of capital requirements 
in a perfectly competitive banking industry with flat-rate deposit 
insurance premiums is investigated. After exploring the possibilities of 
risk-weighted capital requirements, it evaluates the theoretical 
adequacy of the Basle Accord on capital standards. 
In Chapter 3 banking regulation is analyzed in a general 
equilibrium setup where banks play an explicit role in evaluating and 
funding real investment projects. I show that in the long-run 
subsidization of risk-taking by a flat rate deposit insurance premium 
leads to over-investment in risky projects, though in the short-run 
capital market imperfections may account for the opposite result. 
Prudential regulation drives its general equilibrium effects through 
changes in intermediation margins, which, in turn, are determinants of 
the solvency of banks. The equilibrium effects may reinforce or weaken 
the direct effects. In particular, the equilibrium effects of an 
increase in the level of systematic risk and those of imposing tougher 
capital standards tend to reinforce the direct consequences typically 
pointed out in partial equilibrium analysis. 
The last chapter examines the prudential regulation of banks in a 
dynamic model of bank behavior which allows for bankruptcy and closure. 
In a dynamic setting, the banker who goes bankrupt is likely to suffer 
losses related to future payoffs. Banking regulation contains special 
provisions for promoters and managers of banks which become insolvent. 
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When the expected future rents are positive, the value of bank charters 
may be an important component of bankruptcy costs to bankers and may 
constitute an incentive to adopt prudent decisions despite the existence 
of a risk-insensitive deposit insurance system. Some authors have 
incorporated the charter as an exogenous bankruptcy cost in a standard 
one-period model, but charter values are intrinsically endogenous. 
In Chapter 4 dynamic programming techniques allow us to obtain 
simultaneously the equilibrium value of a bank and the bank's optimal 
investment and financial policies. Risky policies are associated to low 
yalues of the bank. Under perfect competition closure rules are 
ineffective in disciplining banks because expected future rents, and 
hence the value of bank charters, are zero. Allowing for the exercise of 
market power, comparative statics provide insights into the fundamentals 
that influence both the value and decisions of a bank. Tough prudential 
regulation, high market power and a low risk-free interest rate 
generally elicit safe policies. So capital and asset regulations, on the 
one hand, and entry and closure rules, on the other, can be regarded as 
alternative ways to preserve solvency. These results are used to derive 
some policy implications for the current regulatory debate in the U.S. 
and Europe. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND BANK BEHAVIOR: 
A MODEL BASED ON OPTION THEORY 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Banking regulation is traditionally intended to provide investor 
protection and to promote financial stability. Three are the rationales 
for these objectives. First, the nature of the banking business makes 
aSY)TImetric information a characteristic of the relationship between the 
banks and their clients. Small depositors in particular have neither the 
incentives nor, probably, the competence to evaluate and monitor the 
quality and behavior of banks, and can be especially exposed to adverse 
selection and moral hazard phenomena. Second, since depositors' 
reactions take the form of deposit withdrawals and many bank assets are 
illiquid, costly bank runs may occur, even as a result of 
self -fulfilling expectations (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 ). Third, given 
the links between financial institutions, negative externalities 
associated to bank failures may exist. 
Depositor protection, on the one hand, requires establishing rules 
in order to preserve or enhance the quality of financial services. 
Financial stability, on the other, demands limiting the incidence of 
bank failures and, in particular, avoiding bank panics, that can lead to 
failures even when the banks involved are solvent. 
We can think of deposit insurance as a mean by which, 
simultaneously, depositors delegate the role of monitoring and 
disciplining banks to the banking authorities and incentives for early 
withdrawal on a purely precautionary basis are removed. Deposit 
insurance, however, creates a regulatory problem: as it is based upon 
transferring the risks of loss from depositors to the deposit insurance 
agency (DIA) ,  regulation (as opposed to the market) has to undertake the 
role of disciplining banks. 
Banking practitioners and scholars have widely recognized that the 
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deposit insurance system is particularly exposed to moral hazard on the 
part of banks' owners. 1 Bank shareholders operate within the domain of 
limited liability and, in the absence of regulation, have much to gain 
and little to lose from raising insured deposits at a close to risk-free 
rate and investing the proceeds in high risk portfolios. Whereas very 
high returns are appropriated by bank shareholders, very low returns 
cause bankruptcy and the intervention of the deposit insurance agency, 
that bears the costs. 
Deposit insurance premiums and regulatory constraints on bank 
decisions not only affect the funding of the DIA, but also the 
capability and the incentives of banks to take risk. Prudential 
regulation may influence bank behavior, stimulate or restrain 
risk-taking, affect the rate at which deposits are supplied, and 
determine both the probability cif failure of the banks and the financial 
condition of the deposit insurance system. 
As first noted by Merton (1977), the deposit insurance agency can 
be considered as the writer of a put option on bank assets with a strike 
price equal to the promised maturity value of deposits. The put option 
is soLd to bank shareholders in exchange of a deposit insurance premium 
and the submission of the bank to capital and asset regulations. From 
Merton's seminal contribution, option valuation formulas have been used 
to assess deposit guarantees for both theoretical and empirical 
2 purposes. 
In that literature, perfect information by the insurer is 
1 See White (1989) and Berlin et aL (1991) for an overview of this issue. 
2 See Merton (1978), Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986), 
Furlong and Keeley (1989), Giammarino et aL (1989), Mullins and Pyle 
(1990), Flannery (1991), King and O'Brien (1991) and Allen and Saunders 
(1993), between others. 
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implicitly assumed and the use of fair deposit insurance premiums is 
. conceived as a feasible (and adequate) way to discipline banks. 
Surprisingly, however, little effort has been made in justifying those 
schemes within models that explicitly formalize the behavior of banks. 
Moreover, in spite of having closed-form formulas for the valuation of 
claims that, as those of bank shareholders, incorporate limited 
liability (Black and Scholes, 1973), this literature has paid small 
attention to the schemes really applied in practice: ordinary capital 
requirements, regulatory limits to risk-taking and, more recently, 
risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios. 
On the contrary, these issues have been addressed by some authors 
using mean-variance models that neglect limited liability (Kahane, 1977; 
Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988)? 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of prudential 
regulation on the behavior of a perfectly competitive bank in a simple 
setup: a two-period model where bank deposits are fully-insured and 
bankers possess limited liability. In contrast with the dominant 
approach to very particular regulatory regimes, my aim is to provide a 
unified setting to examine different types of regulation, from the 
perfect-information risk-based proposal to the risk-insensitive or 
partly risk-sensitive schemes that exist in many countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the 
decision problem of the bank under a general regulatory framework. 
Section 3 illustrates the need for regulation by analyzing the behavior 
of the bank when it faces a flat-rate deposit insurance premium and no 
other regulation exists. The most traditional regulation, consisting of 
complementing flat-rate premiums with risk-insensitive capital standards 
and asset restrictions, is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses 
3 Keeley and Fur long (1990) go over this remark. 
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the risk-based regulatory proposal. Concluding remarks are contained in 
Section 6. 
2. THE DECISION PROBLEM OF A BANK. 
The model that I present in this section formalizes the decision problem 
of a perfectly competitive bank in a two-period economy (t=O, l ). The 
bank is conceived as the investment project of a group of investors 
called bankers. Bankers are risk-neutral, have an initial wealth W and 
o 
can borrow or lend on personal account at the risk-free rate of 
interest, r. Bankers' investment in bank capital, K ,  o is protected by 
the standard limited liability provision of equity contracts. 
At t=O the bank raises insured deposits D and capital K in order o . 0 
to invest the funds in a portfolio of risky assets. The gross return of 
the portfolio of assets R(<r ) is a random variable with expected value o 
( l+r) and a variance that increases with <r .  In order to obtain a o 
convenient closed form for the bank's objective function, I assume that 
R(<r ) is log-normally distributed: o 
2 R(<r ) = (1 +r )exp(<r Z-<r 12) ,  o 0 0 (1) 
where Z is a standard normal random variable. F(z)  and f(z) will 
respectively denote the distribution and density functions of z. The 
decision of the bank entails choosing D , K  and <r . o 0 0 
At t=O the bank incurs in two different costs per unit of 
deposits: the deposit insurance premium p and some intermediation costs 
c which are link to the provision of transaction services to depositors. 
c is a constant, while the specification of p varies across different 
regulatory regimes. In general p may depend upon bank decisions. We 
assume p+c<l, so that each unit of raised deposits provides I-p-c units 
of funds for investment. If A denotes the value of the portfolio of o 
assets at t=O, the bank's budget constraint imposes: 
Deposit Insurance and Bank Behavior 
A = Cl-p-c)D + K . o 0 0 
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(2) 
At t=l, once asset returns are observed, the net worth of the bank, 
Nl
, is computed as the difference between the value of assets, Al, and 
liabilities, D . The value of assets results from applying the 1 
stochastic return RCO' ) to A : o 0 
A = R(O' ) [ ( 1-p-c)D +K ] .  1 0 0 0 (3) 
Liabilities are made up of promised payments to depositors (principal 
plus interest) .  Since deposits are fully insured, their interest rate, 
r , does not depend on default risk. I assume that r is taken as given 
D D 
by the bank: 
D = ( 1+r )D . 1 D 0 
Putting together (3) and (4), we can write: 
N = R(O' ) [ ( 1-p-c)D +K ] - ( l+r )D . 1 0 0 0 D 0 
(4) 
(5) 
Because of limited liability, bankers receive N only when positive. If 1 
N �O, the bank liquidates the assets, pays off the depositors, and N 1 1 
accrues to bankers. If N <0, the DIA closes the bank, pays off the 1 
depositors and, as receiver, liquidates the assets; payments to bankers 
are zero. Thereby, bankers' payoffs can be represented by: 
max{N ,O}. 1 (6) 
As N =A -D , the payoffs implied by equation (6)  can be interpreted 1 1 1 
as those of a (European) call option on the bank's portfolio of assets 
with strike price D and maturity t=l (see Figure 1). The bankers only 1 
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max{N , a } 1 
-D 1 
FIGURE 1 
Bankers' payoff at t=l 
as a function of the return on assets 
24 
max { A  -D , O} 1 1 
A 1 
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exercise their right to buy the assets when its value at the maturity 
date, AI'  is greater than the pre-established price, D( Not to exercise 
the option is equivalent to declaring bankruptcy. 
Expression (6) can be decomposed in order to show the impact of 
limited liability: 
max{N ,O} = N + max{-N , O}. 1 1 1 (7) 
As Merton noted, bankers are not only the owners of the bank's net worth 
(the first term) but also of a put option representing the value . of 
limited liability (the second term) .  Under deposit insurance, the writer 
of such a put option is the DIA, which is responsible for paying-off 
depositors upon bank default. 4 
Bankers seek to maximize the expected value of their final wealth, 
W ,  which is made up of the proceeds from the bank plus the return (or 1 
payment) associated to their net lending position on personal account: 
W = max{N ,O} + ( l+rHW -K ) .  1 1 0 0 (8 )  
Taking expectations in (8 )  and dividing by ( 1+r ) ,  we can verify that 
maximizing the expected value of W is equivalent to maximize the net 1 
present value of bankers' investment in the bank, V : o 
V = ( l+rfIE[max{N ,O}l-K = E[max{( l+rflN , O}l-K . o 1 0 1 0 (9) 
Thereby, V will be the objective function in the bank's decision o 
problem. 
4 In absence of deposit insurance, depositors would be the writers of 
the put and deposits would not be safe. 
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Obtaining a closed form for V as a function of the decision o 
-1 ,variables entails the computation of E[max{( l+r ) N ,a} ] .  To begin with, 1 
define as the discounted value of the difference between the 
risk-free interest rate and the deposit rate, (r-r )/(1+r ) .  Next plug 
D 
equation ( 1 )  into (5) and divide the result by ( l+r) in order to get: 
-1 2 ( 1+r) N = exp(o- z-o- 12) [ ( 1-p-c)D +K ] -  )D 1 0 0 0 0  0' ( 10) 
that depends on r and r only through IJ. • 
D D 
From equation (10 ) ,  a value z can be defined such that N 2:0 if and 1 
only if Z2:z: 
( 11 )  
So,  we can write: 
00 
E[max{( l+rf1N ,O} ]  = f ( 1+rf1N f(z)dz, 1 1 Z 










exp(o- Z-0-2/2)f(Z)dZ] [ ( 1-p-c)D +K ] - ( 1-IJ. ) [ 1-F(z ) ]D . ( 12) o 0 0 0 D 0 Z 
f(z) is the density function of a standard 
2 exp(o- z-o- 12)f(z)=f(z-0- ) . o 0 0 
w=O' -z and defining x as 0 
written as F(x), so that 
Then, introducing 
0-0 -z,  the integral 
plugging the result 
normal random 
the change of 
in equation ( 12) 
in equation (9) 
( 13) 
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x = ( 1/a- ){log[ ( I-p-c )D +K l-log(1-/-l )-log(D )+a-2/2}. 
o 0 0 D 0 0 
( 14)  
From equation (13), we can deduct that the net present value of the bank 
to bankers is made up of one positive and two negative components: ( i )  
the (positive) value of assets, Oi) the (negative) value of payments to 
depositors, and ( iii) the (negative) initial investment of capital. 
Because of limited liability, the value of assets to bankers results 
from computing the mean of the truncated log-normal random variable that 
yields R(a- ) in non-bankruptcy states and zero otherwise. The value of 
o 
deposits is clearly the present value of promised payments to 
depositors, ( l-/-l)D , times the probability of the bank being solvent, 
D 0 
F(x-a- ) .  Finally, the initial capital investment enters directly in the 
o 
equation since it takes place at t=O, no matter the bank being or not 
solvent at t=1. Notice that F(x-a-) is an expression that allow us, to 
o 
assess the solvency of the bank. 
For notational convenience, 
deposits ratio: 
define k as the net capital to 
o 
(15) 
where I refer to net capital as the result of subtracting costs incurred 
at t=O from the capital initially invested in the bank. Now, 
substituting (k +p+c)D for K in equations ( 13 )  and ( 14)  and defining 
o 0 0 
y as the vector (D , k  ,a- ) ,  we can re-write V as follows: 
o 0 0 0 0 
where 
V(y ) = [ ( l+k )F(x) - (l-/-l )F(x-a-) - (k +p+c) ]D , 
o 0 D 0 0 0 
x = ( 1/a-Hlog(l+k ) -log(I-/-l )+a-2/21-
o 0 D 0 
( 16 )  
( 17)  
If we take y as the vector of decision variables, the problem of the 
o 
bank is to choose the bank' s size (Do )' capital structure (ko) and 
portfolio risk (a- ) in order to maximize V(y ) .  
o 0 
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At this point, some properties of this objective function can be 
remarked: 
( i )  x, as defined in ( 17) ,  does not depend on D .  Thereby the o 
probability of bankruptcy depends on financial structure and portfolio 
risk, but it does not depend on size. This result comes from constant 
returns to scale in intermediation (constant c) and perfect competition 
(constant /J. ) .  
D 
Oi) The derivative of V(y ) with respect to x is zero. In order to ° 
prove the result, notice that given the form of the density function of 
a standard normal random variable, 
aF ( x - O"  ) 
= f(x-O" ) = exp(O" x_O"z 12)f(x) .  
o 0 0 




v [(1+k )-(1-/J. lexp(O" x-0"2/2l ]f(x)D ° D 0 0 0 
Z But, from the definition of x, exp(O" X-O" 12) is equal to ( 1+k )I(I-/l ) ,  
o 0 0 D 
so that the term in square brackets and, hence, the derivative are zero. 
( iii ) According to equation (7) ,  the value of the bank can be decomposed 
as the sum of the value of an equivalent fully-liable bank, V (y ) ,  and 
A 0 
the value of limited liability, V (y ) :  
B 0 
where 
V (y ) = (/J. -p-c)D , 
A 0 D 0 
V (y ) = { (1-/J. )[l-F(x-O" ) ]  - ( 1+k )[1-F(x)]}D . 
B O D 0 0 0 
( 18)  
( 19)  
The expression for V (y l can be obtained as a result of setting 
A 0 
F(x)=F(x-O" )=1 in equation ( 16) ,  since a fully-liable bank would never 
o 
Deposit Insurance and Bank Behavior 29 
go bankrupt. The expression for V (y ) arises when V (y ) is subtracted 
B O A 0 
from V(y ) .  V (y ) is an interesting re-statement, in terms of the o B 0 
notation used throughout this paper, of Merton' s  formula for valuing 
deposit guarantees (Merton, 1977).  Clearly, V (y ) has as V(y ) the 
B O O 
property of its partial derivative with respect to x being zero. 
( iv) Notice that V (y ) depends on k and (J" only if p does. With a 
A 0 0 0 
constant or null p, V (y ) only depends on D .  This means that, for the 
A 0 0 
fully-liable bank, financial structure and portfolio risk are irrelevant 
as 'in the Theorem of Modigliani and Miller ( 1958) .  On the contrary, the 
contribution of limited liability is increasing and linear in D ,  and o 
depends negative but non-linearly on k and positive but non-linearly 'on 
o 
(J" .  These properties are clearly related to the option-like returns of o 
limited liability, which are higher the lower the (negative) 
conditional-on-bankruptcy net worth of the bank. 
(v) Finally, the decomposition above allow us to write an expression for 
V(yo) that will very clearly show the contribution of V (y ) to the B 0 
value of the bank and its potential effect on bank behavior: 
V(y ) = (/l -c)D + [V (y ) - pD J. o .  D O  B O  0 (20) 
Although I will be more precise in next sections, the sort of 
regulatory devices analyzed in this paper consist of constraints upon 
bank decisions and transfers of funds between the bank and the DIA at 
t=O. The transfers of funds between the bank and the DIA are conducted 
through the deposit insurance premium, whereas the regulatory 
constraints on bank behavior (capital requirements and restrictions 
affecting the composition of bank portfolios) are included (together 
with the range of variation of the decision variables) in the definition 
of the set of feasible decision vectors. 
If we denote the premium setting function by p(y ) and the set of 
o 
feasible controls by fc[R3, the decision problem of the bank can be 
formalized as 
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(21 )  
The properties of V(y 0 I p=p(y 0)) and the (regulatory) definition of r 
will be crucial in determining the behavior of the banle 
3. THE BEHAVIOR OF AN UNREGULATED BANK. 
, 
Assume that the deposit insurance premium is a constant p and the 
feasible set r only specifies the range of variation of D ,  k and 0" .  o 0 0 
In particular, 
where the lower bound to k comes from requiring K �o (see equation o 0 
( 15 ) ) ,  and 0" stands for the volatility of the riskiest portfolio of 
assets in the economy. Ci is finite provided that the returns on existing 
assets have finite variance and short-selling is forbidden. 




D [(l+k )F(x)-(1-j.l )F(x-O" )-(k +p+c)] <> 0, o D 0 0 o 
av 




It  is immediate that V(y ) decreases with k and increases with 0" ,  0 0 0 
reflecting that the decisions of the bank on capital structure and 
portfolio risk are led by the limited liability component of its value 
(see equation (20) ) .  The flat-rate deposit insurance system allows the 
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bank to appropriate this value, whatever its significance, by paying a 
. constant rate of interest and a constant premium per unit of deposits. 
Accordingly, the optimal decision of the bank, y� , involves k�=-(p+c) 
and <T*=<r so that both the lower bound to k and the upper bound to <T o ' 0 0 
are binding. 
Equation (22) implies that V(y ) is a linear function of D whose 
o 0 
slope may be positive or negative. However, for the optimal values of k 
o 
and <T ,  
o 
the sign of (22) is positive, since the last term in (22) 
cancels out when k =-Cp+c) whereas the others 
o 
of deposits) of the call option representing 
which, by definition, cannot be negative: 
give the value (per unit 
bankers' payoffs at t:=1, 
 I y. = [ ( 1-p-c )F(x)-(1-/lD )F(x-<r ) ]  > O. o 0 
Consequently, for any meaningful values of p, c, /lD and <T, the bank 
wants to raise an infinite amount of deposits. The intuition is clear. 
For the uncapitalized bank, the flat-rate deposit insurance scheme 
comprises an opportunity to obtain unlimited profits: bankers' wealth at 
stake is zero, whilst the proceeds of investing insured deposits in 
risky assets are positive. Competition for deposits would lead /l to -00. 
D 
In such conditions, no equilibrium can exist. 
Instead of inspecting notably different setups -where, by means of 
introducing risk-aversion and market power into the analysis, we might 
force the conclusion that unregulated banking systems are compatible 
with equilibrium- I will stick to the benchmark case described above, 
examining whether alternative premium-setting functions or some 
regulatory constraints on bank decisions can solve the problem. As we 
will verify in the next section, the unboundedness of the solution of 
the bank's problem disappears -for some finite values of /l - as soon as D 
capital requirements or risk-based deposit insurance premiums are 
introduced. 
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4. THE TRADITIONAL RISK-INSENSITIVE REGULATION. 
For many years, prudential regulation in US and Europe has been based on 
flat-rate deposit insurance premiums. Moreover, many central banks 
afforded implicit insurance to bank deposits in spite of the lack of 
formal arrangements regulating these guarantees and, consequently, the 
contribution of the banks to its funding. Still, most banking systems 
are subject to regulatory constraints that affect decisions on assets 
and liabilities. Capital requirements and restrictions on portfolio 
composition, off -balance-sheet operations, short-selling, sectorial and 
geographical concentration of lending and so forth have been broaqly 
used. Fully risk-insensitive capital and asset regulations were dominant 
throughout the world until the introduction of the risk-based capital 
adecuacy standards resulting from the Basle Accord (BIS, 1988) and the 
broader directives of the European Comunity (EC, 1989a, 1989b) .  
Nominally, the purpose of  asset and liability regulations is to 
promote proper risk-taking by banks, reducing the incidence of failures. 
They aim, on the one hand, to limit the dead-weight losses associated 
with raising the public funds used to cover potential deficits of the 
DIA and, on the other, to ameliorate the residual external costs of bank 
failures to the financial system (already reduced by the existence of 
deposit insurance) .  
4.1. Introducing capital requirements and limits to asset risk. 
In this section, deposit insurance premiums are assumed to be constant, 
p=p, and capital requirements are formallized as a lower bound to the 
capital ratio, k �k, o where k>-Cp+c) .  Restrictions 
on portfolio 
composition are represented by (i which is now assumed to be controlled 
by the regulator. Formally, 
r = {y eIR31 D �O, k �k>-(p+c) ,  iT�O' �O}, o 0 0 0 
where k and 0' are regulatory parameters. Risk-insensitiveness is 
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reflected by the fact that p, k and cr are constants that, as such, do 
not depend on bank decisions. Note that imposing a minimum net capital 
to deposits ratio k is equivalent to imposing a minimum net capital to 
assets ratio 0, where o=k/(l+kl .  5 
As regulatory constraints affecting decisions on financial 
structure and portfolio risk remain independent from each other, partial 
derivatives obtained in equations (22) , (23)  and (24) still guide the 
determination of the optimal solution to the problem of the bank. In 
particular, as V(y 0 I p=p) is decreasing in ko and increasing in cr 0' both 
the capital requirement and the limit to portfolio risk are binding, . so 
that k*=k and cr*�. o 0 
The key difference with respect to the unregulated case is that 
k+p+c>O and, then, there always exits a value f.e such that the partial 
D 
derivative of V(y 0 I p=p) with respect to Do is zero: 
(25)  
Notice that, on the one hand, as f.LD tends to 1 ,  F(x) and F(x-;T) tend to 
1 and, then, the left hand side of this equation goes to (l-P-c» O. On 
the other hand, as f.L tends to -(I) (Le. r tends to infinity, r being 
D D 
finite) ,  the first and second terms in the left hand side tend to zero, 
5 Suppose a net capital to assets requirement of the form: 
Solving for K o we can 
K - ( p+ c ) D  o 0 
( 1-p-c ) D  +K o 0 
-1 write K 2:[(p+c)+(l-o) o lD o 0 From the definition 
of k ,  an equivalent inequality is k 2:0/(1-0 ) .  So, setting o=k/( l+k) ,  we 
o 0 
can obtain k 2:k. o 
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whilst the third is . 6 negative. Thus, by 
34 
continuity, there exists a 
finite /-L� that solves (24) .  Moreover, /-L� is unique because the left hand 
side of (25)  is increasing in /-L • 
D 






e and any positive value D e[O,oo) for f. =f.e . Therefore, as in the 
O D D 
usual perfectly competitive firm with constant returns to scale, the 
zero profit condition given by equation (25)  affords an implicit 
definition of a horizontal deposit supply curve. 
Vertical movements of this horizontal supply curve can be obtained 
by totally differentiating (25) :  
The margin at which the supply of deposits is positive and finite, /-L� , 
increases with k, p and c, whereas decreases with CJ'. This means that 
tigher regulation makes banking activity more costly so that the margin 
per unit of deposits which is necessary to compensate bank shareholders 
for their capital investment rises. 
Figure 2 represents the deposit supply curve of the bank as a 
function of /-L
D 
and the variation of /-L� with the parameters. Clearly, the 
equilibrium in the market for deposits could be fully characterized by 
adding the corresponding (downward sloping) demand curve fer deposits. 
6 Notice that ( l+k)F(x) tends to zero when /-Le tends to -00, because F(x) 
D  
tends to zero. Observe also that (l+k)F(x)-(1-/-Le)F(x-<r) can never be 
D 
negative, since by definition  it is the value (per unit of deposits) of 
the call option that represents bankers' payoffs at t=1. In addition, 
( l-/-Le )F(x-a:)�O for all /-Le<1. So if the limit of  )F(x-a-) were 
D D  
different from zero a contradiction would be obtained. 
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4.2. Fair flat-rate premiums. 
Let us briefly examine the case in which the regulator -knowing that the 
optimal behavior of the bank involves k*=k and CJ'*=Ci, and leads to Il =IJ.e-o 0 D D 
fixes the flat-rate deposit insurance premium so as to absorb the value 
of limited liability, pD =V (y* ) .  o B 0 
v (y ) is linear in D , we can write: 8 0 0 
From equation ( 19 )  
p = ( l-lle ) [ l-F(x-Ci) ]-(1+k)[ l-F(x) ] . D 
and given that 
(26) 
If we plug this expression for p in equation (25) ,  terms cancel out and 
a very simple solution for Ile is obtained: 
D 
(27) 
Intuitively, as the premium absorbs V (y ) ,  the value of the banking 8 0 
activity is reduced to the profits of pure intermediation in deposits, 
(IJ. -cm (see equation (20 ) ) .  In equilibrium, where the supply of 
D 0 
deposits has to be finite, perfect competition leads such profits to 
zero, yielding (27) .  
From this result we can deduct that if  the flat premium is  set 
below its fair value, the implicit subsidy is transferred to depositors, 
yielding an equilibrium intermediation margin which is smaller than the 
marginal cost of intermediation, Ile<c. The opposite result is obtained 
D 
if the flat premium is greater than its fair value. 
Equation (26)  implies that the fair deposit insurance premium in 
this context is a decreasing function of k and /le ( L e. , of c ) ,  and an 
D 
increasing function of Ci. So, if the regulator wants the DIA to break 
even, a trade-off between flat premiums and complementary capital and 
asset regulations exists: the higher p, the softer the required 
complementary constraints. 
Notice that, with the ex-post fair deposit insurance premium, the 
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DIA can be funded on a no subsidy nor profits basis, but the behavior of 
the bank is still biased towards risk because no incentives are provided 
in order to correct the distortions of limited liability. On the 
contrary, solvency is promoted by imposing direct limits to the 
operative capacity of the bank. 
For the fair p, the probability of survival of the bank has the 
following expression: 
F(x-cr) 
- - e -2 
= F{(1/cr) [ log(l+k)-log( 1-1l )+cr 12]}. 
D 
Hence, the solvency of the bank increases with k and Ile (Le. with c ) ,  
D 
and decreases with cr. Then, tigher regulation by constraining financial 
and investment decisions curtails the operative capacity of the bank, 
but enhances its solvency. 
To sum up, fair flat-rate deposit insurance premiums do not correct 
the distortions created by limited liability. However, as the insurer 
anticipates that the insured bank will maximize V (y ) up to the limits 
B 0 
imposed by k and cr, she can establish p so as to assure that the 
collected premiums equate the expected discounted value of her 
liabilities  and deposits are provided at the marginal cost of 
intermediation. Any insured bank intending to pursue a more prudent 
policy (say, k >k or cr <0-) would behave SUb-optimally and could not pay o 0 
as high an interest rate on deposits as those of its competitors. 
Actually, its optimal supply of deposits at the market intermediation 
margin Il� would be zero. 
5. THE RISK-SENSITIVE REGULATION. 
5.1. The rationale for risk-based regulation. 
The intuition underlying the risk-based regulatory proposal is very 
simple. Let regulatory restrictions affecting a bank being contingent on 
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its behavior. More concretely, define the premium setting function p(y ) 
o 
and the feasible set r in such a way that V (y ) be absorbed by p(y )D B O o 0 
for all feasible y : 
o 
V (y )-p{y )D = 0 for all y er. 
B O O 0 0 (28 )  
Then, the bankers will be  indifferent among the financial structures and 
portfolio compositions in r. 
From equation (20) ,  the bank's objective function under the 
risk-sensitive regulation defined in (28)  has the following expression 
for all y er: 
o 
{f.l -c)D . 
D 0 
This means that the value of the bank to bankers comes from the profits 
from intermediation as for a fully-liable bank. Clearly, as it does not 
depend on k and (J' ,  the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds. On the other 
o 0 
hand, the optimal supply of deposits is any positive and finite value 
for f.l =c, infinite for f.l >c and zero for /l <c. Then f.le =c. 
D D D 
Notice that the crucial difference between risk-insensitive and 
risk-based regulation is not in the form of the deposit supply, nor in 
the determination of f.le (which is c in both cases when flat-rate 
D 
premiums are fair) , nor in the fairness of the premiums, but in the 
(desirable)  irrelevance of financial structure and portfolio risk that 
characterizes the latter but not the former. Thereby, we can conclude 
that when banking regulation provides the adequate incentives, limited 
liability and deposit insurance may be innocuous in the sense that, 
although bankruptcy is possible and depositors are insured, optimal bank 
decisions are the same as those of a (fictitious) fully-liable bank. 
5.2. Risk-based premiums versus risk-based capital requirements. 
Variable deposit insurance premiums are the most direct way to implement 
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(28) .  No other regulation is needed in such a case. 
39 
Setting /.l =c in 
D 
(19) ,  the premiums can be fixed according to the following schedule: 
( 1-c) [ 1-F(x-o- ) ]  - (1+k ) [ l-F(x) ]  o 0 
and the feasible set can be that of an unregulated bank. The partial 
derivatives of p(y ) show that it is decreasing in k and increasing in o 0 
0- .  p(y ) is decreasing in c because when c goes up the equilibrium o 0 
intermediation margin rises, enhancing the solvency of the bank. 
Figure 3 depicts the contour plot of function p(y ) in the (k ,o- ) o 0 0 
space, for O<k �0.20 and 0<0- �0. 25. In this figure, c takes value 0 .03, o 0 
but the results are qualitatively identical for other values. The 
isopremium curves are clearly upward sloping, but the upper contour sets 
are not convex nor concave in general. Contour sets with higher p(y ) o 
values can be reached moving up and to the left. The figure shows that 
the risk-based premium schedule is non-linear, so that linear schemes 
(sometimes included in practical proposals of banking reform) can hardly 
aproximate it . 
As an alternative to variable premiums, authors as Sharpe (1978) ,  
Ronn and Verma ( 1989) ,  and Mullins and Pyle ( 1990) have suggested that, 
with a flat-rate premium p=p, risk-based regulation could be conducted 
through risk-sensitive capital requirements. In our framework, these 
would have the form: 
where g(o- ) solves . 0 
with 
p = ( l-c)[1-F(x-o- ) ]  - [ 1+g(o- ) ] [ l-F(x) ] , o 0 (29) 
0' 
o 
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FIGURE 3 
Contours of p(y ) in the (k ,0' ) space 
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X := (1Ia- ){log[1+g(a- ) ]-log(1-c)+a-2/2}. 
o 0 0 
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Equation (29)  defines an implicit function g(a- ) .  Total differentiation 
o 
in (29)  shows that this function is increasing, since 
g' (a- ):=(1-c)f(x-a- )I[ 1-F(x) ]>O. The function moves down when p or c go 
o 0 
up. Intuitively, as both asset risk and leverage rise the value of the 
deposit guarantee, the risk-based capital requirement reduces maximum 
allowed leverage in response to increases 
V (y )�pD for all feasible y . 
in a­
o 
so as to assure 
B O O 0 
Imposing such a risk-based capital requirement is not, however, 
equivalent to charging variable premiums. Recall that with flat-rate 
premiums, the bank's objective function is decreasing in k 
o 
and 
increasing in a- .  
o 
Suppose that the bank is subject. to the constraint 
k �g(a- ) .  Then, from the definition of g(a- ) ,  the bank is indifferent 
o 0 0 
between any (k ,a- ) verifying k =g(a- ) ,  i .e .  any point belonging to the 
o 0 0 0 
isopremium curve corresponding to p in Figure 3. However, it clearly 
prefers any of these choices to any (k�,a-� ) such that k�>g(a-� ) ,  L e. any 
point below and to the right of this curve. Consequently, the risk-based 
capital requirement is always binding. 
Whereas with risk-based premiums bankers are indifferent among all 
feasible choices of (k ,a- ) ,  with risk-based capital requirements 
o 0 
indifference applies only to choices in a same isopremium curve, and 
those on the curve p are the only optimal ones. By introducing an 
additional constraint in the decision problem, the capital requirement 
guarantees that the bank will not choose at once too high leverage and 
portfolio risk, but in exchange makes decisions involving low leverage 
and low risk (k >g(a- ) )  being sub-optimal. Those decisions could have 
o 0 
been chosen under risk-based premiums. 
In  spite of this rigidity, risk-based capital requirements are 
remarkably more flexible than the risk-insensitive regulation analyzed 
in Section 4, since under risk-insensitive deposit insurance premiums, 
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minimum capital ratios and upper bounds to 0'0'  the bank makes 
(k ,0' )=(k,a-). That is, 
o 0 in terms of Figure 3, the set of optimal 
decisions contains only one point: (k,a-) . Note that if the flat premium 
P is actuarially fair, the isopremium curve containing (k,a-) will 
correspond to p(y )=p. o 
Either if based upon deposit insurance premiums or solvency ratios, 
establishing a risk-sensitive regulation requires two necessary 
conditions. The first is to observe the decisions of the bank,  the 
second is to be able to enforce relatively complex non-linear regulatory 
rules. In some inf ormational and institutional contexts, these 
conditions clearly fail. 
If the regulator cannot observe 0' or the timing of events is such 
o 
that the bank chooses (J' once premiums and solvency ratios have been 
o • 
imposed, then premium schedules and capital requirements cannot not be 
contingent on 0'0' and the bank chooses the portfolio with the maximum 
feasible level of risk. Correcting such a moral hazard problem would 
probably require regulatory instruments that are not explicitly 
considered in this paper. Agency theory suggests that the solution to 
moral hazard might consist in modifying bankers' payoff, i. e. 
introducing ex-post transfers such as taxes on bank profits, penalties 
d . 7 an prizes. 
In practice, difficulties proceed from the need of compatibilizing 
the imperfect measurement of (J' by the regulator and the complexity of 
o 
theoretic risk-based schedules with the precise legal terms in which 
risk-based regulation has to be dictated. As a consequence, the 
regulator may opt for risk-insensitive schemes as those of Section 4 or 
7 John, John and Senbet (1991) examine corporate taxation as a possible 
way to induce safe decisions in a context of asymmetric information on 
bank actions. 
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simplified risk-based regulations as those of the Basle Accord on 
capital standards. 
5.3. Risk-weighted capital requirements and the Basle Accord. 
The approval of the Basle proposal on capital standards has meant the 
major worldwide change in banking regulation of the last decades. Most 
of the developed countries, including those of the G-lO and the European 
Community, have reorganized their capital adequacy rules in order to 
introduce risk-weighted capital requirements as a complement to 
flat-rate deposit insurance premiums. In a risk-weighted capital 
requirement, capital is related to a combination (usually a sum) of 
diff erent asset or off-balance sheet exposures, weighted according to 
their relative riskiness. 
This section analyzes a general class of risk-weighted capital 
requirements, which includes, as a particular case, those of the Basle 
Accord. After extending the model of the previous sections to be 
explicit on the composition of the bank's asset portfolio, I 
characterize a risk-weighted capital requirement designed to make the 
bank indifferent between assets with the same expected return but 
different levels of risk. Such solvency ratio would mimic the properties 
of the risk-based capital ratio defined in equation (29) .  The results 
suggest that linear risk-weighted ratios as those introduced in many 
countries might not provide an adequate trade-off between portfolio risk 
and leverage and, consequently, might bias the portfolio choice of the 
banks towards specific asset categories. 
To obtain a closed form for the bank's objective function when a 
variety of assets is considered, it is very convenient to adopt a 
specification such that the gross return on the portfolio of assets is 
still log-normally distributed. Merton ( 1971, 1990) showed that in a 
continuous-time framework, whenever log-normality of gross returns for 
individual assets is assumed, the gross return on any portfolio with a 
constant composition between t=O and t=1 will also be log-normally 
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distributed. 8 
Assume that the asset portfolio of the bank is composed of n 
different assets, i=1 ,2, . . .  ,n, whose gross returns, R ,  are log-normally 
i 
distributed: 
2 R = (1+r)exp(cr.z.-cr. l2) ,  
i l l 1 
where z=(zl" " , zn
) is vector of standard normal random variables with 
zero mean, unit variance and a correlation matrix P=[P . .  J .  All the 1J 
assets have an expected return ( 1+r) and P . .  can be interpreted as the IJ 
correlation between the ( log) returns on assets i and j :  
Var[ logR. , logR.J = ( 1+r)cr cr p . 1 J 1 j ij 
Denote the fraction of the bank's total assets invested in asset i 
at t=O by w , where 0::w.::1 and r: w.=1. Following Merton (1990) ,  pp. 1 1 1 =1 1 
132-6, the bank' s portfolio can be though of as a composite asset with a 
log-normal gross return defined by: 
2 R(w) = (1+r)exp[cr(w)z-cr (w)/21 ,  
where 
w=(w , . . .  ,w ) ,  1 n 
2 cr (w)=w'�w, 
(30) 
8 In Merton's  result, continuous-time is necessary in order to allow for 
a continuous rebalancing of the portfolio to some initial weightings w. 
If such rebalancing did not take place, log-normality can still be used 
as an approximation. This approximation is commonly used for valuing 
options on a portfolio of stocks. 
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L=[O" . . 1=[0".0".P . . J .  I J  1 J IJ 
and z= [L w.O".z. l/O"(w). 1 =1 1 1 1 
Finally, assume that p=p and the capital requirement establishes 
the constraint 
k � k(w) , o 
where k(w) is a function to be defined. 
(32) 
Constraint (32) may represent the type of minimum constant capital 
to weighted-assets ratios commonly specified in actual regulation. If 
weighted assets are h(w)A and the minimum ratio is '1, the corresponding o 
capital to weighted-assets ratio is equivalent to (32) if 
-1 9 k(w)=[1-'1h(w) ] '1h(w) .  Roughly speaking, the Basle proposal sets '1=0.08 
and defines a linear function h(w)=L a. w ,  where the a. coefficients 
i =1 i i i 
are 0, 0. 10, 0 .20, 0.50 or l according to the risk category where each 
asset (or off -balance-sheet exposure)  is classified. 
At this point, we can substitute w for 0" in the vector of decision o 
variables and O"(w) for 0" in the bank' s objective function. The 
o 
optimization problem of the bank in this framework is as follows: 
where 
Maximize V(Yo \ p=p) ,  
y E r o 
n 
r = {y ElRzxlRN \ D �O, k �k(w),  O�w.�l ,  L w.=l}. o 0 0 1 1 i =1 
9 See Footnote 5. 
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In order to analyze the solution to this problem, notice that the 
objective function is decreasing in k ,  as in previous sections. Hence, o 
the capital requirement will be binding and we can substitute k(w) for 
k in the objective function. The resulting expression is linear in D o 0 
and depends on w only through k(w) and a-(w) .  
Now, we are interested in characterizing a risk-weighted capital 
requirement k(w) such that the optimal portfolio choice is 
indeterminate, as it would be for a risk-neutral fully-liable bank. From 
the definition of the risk-based capital requirement in section 5.2,  we 
can simply make k(w)=g[a-(w) l ,  where g(cr) is the function implicitly 
defined in equation (29) .  
The partial derivative of  k(w) with respect to  w is 
i 
8 k  dg [cr (w)  1 80" ( w)  
 = dcr( w ) · 8w 
i 
The first factor can be obtained differentiating in (29) :  
dg [ cr( w ) ] 
dO" ( w )  = 
(1- )f [ x-cr ( w) ]  0 /l
D 1 - F ( x ) > . 
On the other hand, from the definition of cr2(w) ,  
Thus, we can write: 
where 
(33) 
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Cov [ l ogR . , 1 o g R ( w )  1 
(3 (w) =  =         
t: cr W j = l  i j  j 
W ' LW 
47 
Equation (33) says that the additional capital to be required per 
unit of deposits when the fraction of total assets invested in a 
particular asset increases must be proportional to the contribution of 
the asset to total portfolio risk. The contribution of asset i to total 
portfolio risk is measured by (3
iR (w),  i .e.  the regression coefficient of 
asset i returns on the returns of the bank's portfolio. 
The risk-weighted capital requirement should penalize the 
investment in risky assets according to their relative riskiness, which 
cannot be measured on an asset-to-asset basis, but taking into account  
the covariance of the returns on an asset and the returns on the other 
assets as well as the composition of the bank's  portfolio. Consider, for 
instance, an asset i whose returns have a big variance but, for a given 
w, are negatively correlated with the bank's portfolio. Then, given this 
w, the risk-based capital requirement should be lower, the higher the 
investment in asset i. This is only, however, a local statement, since 
(3 (w) 
iR 
is increasing in w .  i Accordingly, if w i goes up, a point is 
reached where (3iR(w) becomes positive and the sign of aklawi changes 
from negative to positive. 
Classifying assets into broad categories of presumptive relative 
riskiness and assigning constant weights to each category is not a good 
approximation to what equation (33) suggests. That is true even if the 
returns of different assets are assumed to be uncorrelated. If this were 
the case, equation (33) would become: 
where L (w) is the 
i 
8 k  
aw 
i 
f [ x -cr ( w) ]  
= (1-11 ) 1 F ( ) - O'(W) · T. (W ) - W. ,  D - x 1 1 (34) 
variance 2 2 ratio cr Icr( w) . It is 
i 
worth noting that w i 
enters in the right hand side, so that ceteris paribus concentration in 
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a particular asset would be penalized. Clearly, with uncorrelated 
assets, concentration impedes diversification and increases total risk. 
From a practical viewpoint, quadratic weighting functions that were 
sensitive to the variances and covariances of asset returns would be 
more appropriate than linear weighting functions applied nowadays, 
specially after the approval of the Basle Accord. 
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
In the vast literature originated by Merton's  ( 1977) discovery of the 
isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and a put option, 
small attention has been paid to the behavior of banks. Actuarially fair 
deposit insurance pricing has been purposed, but no systematic analysis 
of bank decisions in different regulatory frameworks has been made. 
Notwithstanding, the option theoretic approach affords an adequate 
treatment of limited liability, which is typically neglected in 
mean-variance models of bank behavior. 
In this paper, I have formalized the decision problem of a 
perfectly competitive bank in a two-period model where deposits are 
fully-insured and bankers have limited liability. 
Bankers seek to maximize the expected value of their final wealth, 
which entails taking decisions so as to maximize the present expected 
value of their investment in the bank, i. e. final payoffs minus the 
initial investment of capital. Final payoffs equal the bank's  net worth 
when positive, and zero otherwise. 
The valuation of this option-like payoffs allow us to obtain a 
closed form for the bank's objective function. Bankers'  problem can be 
written as consisting in choosing the bank's supply of deposits, capital 
structure and portfolio risk. Regulation enters as a set of constraints 
in the optimization problem. Deposit insurance premiums, capital 
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requirements and limits to the risk of bank assets are the three 
instruments considered in this paper. 
When the only regulatory device is a flat-rate deposit insurance 
premium, the behavior of the bank is governed by the limited liability 
component of its value, and causes the collapse of the deposit insurance 
system. Profits are maximized by putting no capital, investing in the 
riskiest portfolio of assets and supplying an infinite amount of 
deposits. 
When a minimum capital ratio is required, the limited liability 
component of the bank's value is no longer obtained for free, but in 
exchange of bankers' capital . A finite solution to the optimization 
problem can be found at an equilibrium intermediation margin that 
depends positively on the stringency of capital and . asset restrictions, 
the deposit insurance premium and the cost of intermediation. 
The difference between risk-sensitive and risk-insensitive 
regulation is not in the fairness of the deposit insurance premium (as 
often alleged in the literature) nor in the deposit supply schedule, but 
in their impact on the financial and investment decisions of banks. 
Risk-based premiums make the bank indifferent among alternative capital 
structures and levels of portfolio risk and the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem holds in contradistinction to risk-insensitive regulation, that 
yields maximum leverage and portfolio risk. 
Direct restrictions on leverage and risk may limit the exposure of 
the deposit insurance system, but at the price of curtailing the 
operative range of the intermediary. 
As an intermediate case in terms of flexibility, risk-based capital 
requirements allow the bank to choose within a specific schedule of 
capital ratios and portfolio risk. When the schedule is properly 
designed, the bank is indifferent between the points in it, but raising 
capital in excess of the amount required in accord with portfolio risk 
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is never optimal. 
In practice, the difficult observation and measurement of risk and 
the need for accuracy in actual regulation entangles the implementation 
of risk-sensitiveness. Nevertheless ;  risk-weighted capital requirements 
recently introduced represent a remarkable attempt in that direction. 
Our characterization of risk-weighted capital requirements suggests 
that linear weighting schemes as those contained in the Basle Accord are 
far from introducing an adequate trade-off between capitalization and 
portfolio risk. Risk-weighted solvency ratios which could reproduce the 
desirable properties of risk-based regulation should penalize the 
investment in risky assets according to their marginal contribution to 
the riskiness of the bank's portfolio. Such contribution should be 
measured by the regression coefficient of each ass�t' s return on the 
returns of the bank's portfolio. Accordingly, weighting functions should 
be sensitive to the variances and covariances of asset returns, and not 
only to univariate risk measures as those considered in the Basle 
Accord. 
Deposit Insurance and Bank Behavior 51 
REFERENCES 
Allen, L. and A. Saunders ( 1993) .  "Forbearance and the Valuation of 
Deposit Insurance as a Callable Put". Journal of Banking and Finance, 
17, 629-43. 
BIS ( 1988) .  "International Convergence of Capital 
Capital Standards" .  Committee on Bank Regulations 
Practices. Bank for International Settlements, Basle. 
Measurement and 
and Supervisory 
Ber<lin, M. , A. Saunders and G. Udell ( 1991) .  "Deposit Insurance Reform: 
What Are the Issues and What Needs to Be Fixed?" .  Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 15, 735-52. 
Black, F. and M. Scholes ( 1973) .  "The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities". Journal of Political Economy, 81, 632-59. 
EC ( 1989a) .  "Directive on the own funds of credit institutions",  
89/299/EEC. OfficiaL Journal of the European Communities, Ll24/16. 
EC ( 1989b) .  "Directive on a solvency ratio for credit institutions" ,  
89/647/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities, L386/32. 
Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig ( 1983) .  "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity" . JournaL of Political Economy, 91, 401-19. 
Flannery, M. (1991) .  "Pricing Deposit Insurance when the Insurer 
Measures Bank Risk with Error" .  Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 
975-98. 
Furlong, F. and M. Keeley ( 1989) .  "Capital Regulation and Bank 
Risk-Taking: A Note" . Journal of Banking and Finance, 13, 883-91. 
Giammarino, R. , E. Schwartz and J. Zechner ( 1989 ) .  "Market Valuation of 
Bank Assets and Deposit Insurance in Canada". Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 22, 109-27. 
John, K. , T. John and L. Senbet ( 1991 ) .  "Risk-Shifting Incentives of 
Depository Institutions: A New Perspective on Federal Deposit Insurance 
Reform". Journal of Banking and Finance, 15, 895-915. 
Kahane, Y. ( 1977) .  "Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial 
Intermediaries".  Journal of Banking and Finance, 2, 207-17. 
Keeley, M. and F. Furlong ( 1990) .  "A Re-Examination of Mean-Variance 
Analysis of Bank Capital Regulation". Journal of Banking and Finance, 
14, 69-84. 
Kim, D. and A. Santomero ( 1988) .  "Risk in Banking and Capital 
Regulation" . Journal of Finance, 43, 1219-33. 
Deposit Insurance and Bank Behavior 52 
King, K. and J. O'Brien ( 1991) .  "Market-based, risk-adjusted examination 
schedules for depository institutions" .  JournaL of Banking and Finance, 
15, 955-74. 
Koehn, M. and A. Santomero ( 1980) .  "Regulation of Bank Capital and 
Portfolio Risk". JournaL of Finance, 35, 1235-50. 
Marcus, A. and 1. Shaked ( 1984) .  "The Valuation of the FDIC Deposit 
Insurance Using Option-Pricing Estimates". JournaL of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 16, 446-60. 
Merton, R. ( 1971) .  "Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a 
Continuous-Time Model". JournaL of Economic Theory, 3, 373-413. 
Merton, R. ( 1977) .  "An analytic Derivation of the Cost of Depo.sit 
Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Aplication of Modern Option Pricing 
Theory". JournaL of Banking and Finance, 1, 3-11. 
Merton, R. ( 1978) .  "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There are 
Surveillance Costs". JournaL of Business, 51, 439-52. 
Merton, R. ( 1990) .  Continuous-Time Finance. Blackwell. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Mullins, H. and D. Pyle ( 1990) .  "Risk-Based Bank Capital".  Mimeo, 
University of Oregon and University of California. 
Modigliani, F. and M. Miller ( 1958) .  "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Investment". American Economic Review, 48, 
261-97. 
Ronn, E. and A. Verma (1986) .  "Pricing risk-adjusted deposit insurance: 
An option based model". JournaL of Finance, 41, 871-95. 
Ronn, E. and A. Verma (1989) .  "Risk-Based Capital Adecuacy Standards for 
a Sample of 43 Major Banks". JournaL of Finance, 13, 21-29. 
Sharpe, W. ( 1978) .  "Bank Capital Adecuacy, Deposit Insurance and 
Security Values". JournaL of FinanciaL and Quantitative AnaLysis, 13, 
701-18. 
White, L. ( 1989) .  "The Reform of Federal Deposit Insurance". JournaL of 
Economic Perspectives, 3, 11-29. 
CHAPTER 3 
BANKING REGULATION IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Corporate finance literature has long recognized that limited liability 
distorts the investment decisions of indebted firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) .  In such a context, debt contracts 
typically incorporate special covenants designed to protect the lenders 
and, simultaneously, to avoid the inefficiencies linked to 
risk-shifting. In the banking industry, however, small depositors have 
neither the incentive nor, probably, the competence to collect 
information and to intervene into bank management. Moreover, their 
reactions take the form of deposit withdrawals, which, given the 
illiquid nature of most bank assets, can give rise to problems ' of 
contagious bank runs and panics (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .  
Deposit insurance is intended to protect small depositors that can 
be affected by asymmetric information problems and to promote financial 
stability that can be threaten by panics. However, as it eliminates 
depositors' discipline by transferring the risk of loss to the insuring 
agency, it may aggravate the risk-shifting incentives of depository 
institutions. Banking regulation is a way through which the insurer 
undertakes precautionary action in order to limit the harmful effects of 
opportunistic bank behavior. 
Extant literature has widely referred to this issue as "the deposit 
insurance moral hazard problem". Deposit insurance has been modeled as a 
put option held by the bank's shareholders (Merton, 1977) .  From here, it 
follows that banks facing a flat-rate deposit insurance premium have an 
incentive to maximize leverage and asset risk. In particular , Kareken 
and Wallace ( 1978) argued that, when banks are perfectly competitive 
value maximizers and bankruptcy generates external (but not internal) 
costs, a flat-rate deposit insurance scheme causes distortions in the 
behavior of banks and leads to efficiency losses. 
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Nonetheless, following the corporate finance literature which 
examines risk-shifting behavior, the moral hazard problem affecting 
banks and the corrective impact of regulation have generally been 
analyzed in partial equilibrium settings, where single competitive banks 
invest in marketable assets with exogenously given prices. In Kareken 
and Wallace's complete markets setting, for instance, deposit insurance 
and even banks lack economic justification. Moreover, in absence of 
regulation, banks could obtain unlimited profits by taking funds from 
insured depositors at a risk-free rate and investing them in profitable 
risky assets. Clearly, however, such situation cannot be an equilibrium 
outcome. Furthermore, if we want the existence of banks to make sense, 
they should play some role in the allocation of resources. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze. banking solvency 
regulation in a general equilibrium setup where the role of banks in 
financing real investment projects is explicitly modeled and the rates 
of return on risky assets and deposits are endogenous. Attention is paid 
to the effects of regulatory changes on equilibrium variables, notably 
aggregate investment and interest rates. This paper does not deal with 
the design of the optimal regulation (a normative approach) but with the 
analysis of the effects of existing regulation (a positive approach). 
Comparative statics, however, provide the basis for the welfare analysis 
of regulatory reforms consisting of variations in the parameters that 
define current regulatory devices. 
Real-world regulation rests on largely risk-insensitive deposit 
insurance premiums and capital requirements. Deposit insurance premiums 
provide funds to the deposit insurance agency (DIA) ,  whilst capital 
requirements, by limiting the leverage of banks, increases the losses to 
shareholders in the event of failure and reduces the probability of 
bankruptcy and the exposure of the DIA. 
This paper is related to Gennotte ( 1990) that has treated the 
impact of deposit insurance on the pricing of banking assets. It is also 
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related to the literature on credit rationing and investment under 
asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; De Meza and Webb, 
1987) that has examined the impact of these financial phenomena on the 
real allocation of resources. This paper coincides with Romer ( 1985) in 
the general equilibrium approach to financial intermediation. 
Some institutional features as full deposit insurance are taken for 
granted in my model. I also assume that insured deposits are the only 
out�;ide source of funds for the banks, whereas inside capital is limited 
to the wealth of existing bankers. This assumption captures in a simple 
way the empirically supported idea that outside capital is specially 
costly to banks. Due to capital market imperfections, probably related 
to incentive problems caused by informational asymmetries and 
contracting costs, banks have difficulties to raise capital at a 
sensible cost, at least in the short run. 
Actually, depending upon the relative scarcity of bankers wealth, 
this model generates different types of equilibrium. In one of them the 
capital endowment of bankers is not binding, whilst in the others 
bankers would like to have more capital in order to expand their 
activities. The first situation corresponds to either the case in which 
market imperfections in raising Qutside capital do not exist (or have 
been overcome) or that of a long-run equilibrium in which, despite of 
these imperfections, inside capital has been accumulated so as to soften 
the wealth constraint of the bankers (perhaps as the result of past 
extraordinary returns on existing capital) ,  Clearly, the other types of 
equilibrium can represent short-run situations in which market 
imperfections impede raising the optimal amount of capital. 
Reducing the discussion to the long-run (or perfect capital 
markets) equilibrium would notably simplify the analysis of the model 
but the alternative equilibria provide useful insights into non-trivial 
aspects of the debate on banking regulation. On the one hand, recent 
experiences of Japan and US banking systems in joining the capital 
adequacy standards set by the Bank for International Settlements show 
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that the difficulties of some banks to raise capital have led to 
reductions in asset growth. On the other hand, if banks could fund at a 
proper cost all their risky investments with outside capital, there 
would not be good reasons to maintain current universal banking and one 
could readily accept narrow banking proposals in which deposit-taking 
institutions invest in risk-free assets whereas capital funded 
investment banks provide finance to risky projects. 
Our model has two dates (t:'=0, 1 )  and three types of risk-neutral 
p.gents: entrepreneurs, bankers and depositors. 
Entrepreneurs are the promoters of heterogeneous real investment 
projects. Their initial wealth is assumed to be zero, but their utility 
depends upon consumption at t=O. So, they want to start their projects 
in order to sell their enterprises in a stock market and obtain some 
profits. Such profits come from the difference between the value of the 
stock they issue and the initial investment in the projects. 
Projects differ in their expected returns. However only the bankers 
have screening technologies to evaluate (at zero cost) their quality, so 
that they are the natural buyers in the stock market, otherwise affected 
by a serious problem of adverse selection. Bankers have an initial 
wealth invested in banking capital. Each banker allocates banking 
capital and deposits in the stock issued by entrepreneurs (risky assets) 
and in a riskless asset. The riskless asset gives an exogenous rate of 
return r . 
B 
Lastly, depositors have an initial wealth that can be invested in 
insured bank deposits or in the riskless asset. I assume that insured 
deposits provide some transaction and liquidity services to depositors 
so that they are willing to demand deposits even when their rate of 





1 lower than the risk-free rate. In this static 
and liquidity services are treated in a reduced 





Summing up, banks perform two functions in this economy: first, 
they provide depositors some transaction-liquidity services associated 
to bank deposits; second, they finance risky investment projects. 
Banks choose the composition of their asset portfolio once deposits 
are taken, intermediation costs and deposit insurance premiums are paid 
and the capital requirement is imposed and verified. Consequently, 
regulation is necessarily insensitive to risk and a moral hazard problem 
arises. 
In this context, the role of the deposit insurance agency (DIA) is 
pretty mechanic and passive. The DIA monitors capital regulation, 
collects the deposit insurance premiums and, when a bank goes bankrupt, 
closes the bank, pays off depositors and liquidates the assets of the 
bank. The DIA does not necessarily break even. In order to close the 
model, we can assume that the DIA invests the premiums in the riskless 
asset at t=O, whereas its surpluses or deficits at t=l are compensated 
with ex-post lump-sum transfers. 2 
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
1 I will refer to the "demand for deposits" instead of the more usual 
"supply of deposits" because deposits are conceived as assets issued by 
banks. On the contrary, risky assets are issued by entrepreneurs and 
demanded by the banks. 
Z If the model were used for welfare analysis, a more careful treatment 
of the problem should take into account the shadow price of public 
funds, as in Laffont and Tirole ( 1986, 1993) .  
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In equilibrium only the subset of highest quality real investment 
projects is funded. Regulatory parameters as well as the safe rate of 
return determine the marginal project undertaken. In the long-run 
equilibrium, the subsidization of risk-taking by the flat-rate deposit 
insurance scheme leads to over-investment in risky projects, in the 
sense that the expected return on the marginal project is smaller than 
the risk-free rate. Thereby, the economy is exposed not only to possibly 
unfair transfers of wealth between taxpayers and banks (as in Merton, 
1977) or between taxpayers and the owners of investment projects (as in 
Gennotte, 1990) ,  but to the costs of serious misallocation of resources. 
Bank competition transfers the subsidy to depositors and entrepreneurs, 
triggering off over-investment. 3 
- Tighter regulation generally has contractionary effects on the markets 
for risky assets and deposits, increasing equilibrium intermediat.ion 
margins and reducing real investment. 
- Even if solvency is the main concern of the regulator, the allocative 
consequences of prudential regulation cannot be neglected, because the 
movement of equilibrium intermediation margins affects the probability 
of failure of individual banks, reinforcing or weakening the direct 
effect on solvency of any regulatory reform. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a 
detailed description of the model and the regulatory framewrok. Section 
3 characterizes the behavior of banks and the equilibrium of the model. 
3 In Gennotte's  model, banks face a heterogeneous population of 
investment projects with binomial returns. Projects are in limited 
supply and banks compete by bidding the price paid to the project's 
initial owner. Projects differ in risk but not in expected return. His 
main finding is that the higher the risk of a project, the higher the 
equilibrium appreciation of its price, so that the original owners of 
the projects capture part of the deposit insurance subsidy. 
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Section 4 presents comparative static results referring to changes in 
the capital requirement, the flat-rate deposit insurance premium, the 
parameter of systematic risk which affects all projects, the capital 
endowment of the banking industry and the safe rate of return. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY. 
2.1. Entrepreneurs. 
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, each of whom is the promoter of a 
risky investment project. Entrepreneurs have no initial wealth and their 
welfare depends exclusively on consumption at t=O. Thus, they want to 
organize and sell their projects at t=O and to consume the proceedings 
in the same period. They do not play any role at t=1. 
Formally, I consider a measure space of risky investment projects 
OR ,:B,A) ,  where !R is the set of labels of the projects, :B is the + + 
o--algebra of Lebesgue measurable subsets of !R ,  and A is the Lebesgue + 
measure. Projects are heterogeneous and labels identify their quality. :B 
can be thought of as the set of possible portfolios. Each project is 
assumed to require a unit investment to be undertaken, so that the 
measure of a portfolio represents the investment required at t=O to 
obtain the return of the projects in it at t=1. 
The gross return on a single project a E !R at date 1 is a random + 
variable R(a) defined by: 
R(a) 0-1 � 2 = oa exp(o-z-o- 12) ,  
where 0<0<1 and z is a standard normal random variable. For the sake of 
simplicity, I assume the existence of a single factor of systematic risk 
in the economy, Z, that explains the stochastic returns of all the 
projects. Independent project-specific risk could be added, but it would 
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not modify the results, because given the infinitesimal size of every 
single project it would be perfectly diversified in any portfolio with 
positive 4 measure. 
distributed random 
variations in the 
With this specification, 
variable with 0-1 mean oa 




is a log-normally 
log-sensitivity (J" to 
decreases with a. 
Log-normality will prove very useful in order to get an explicit closed 
form for the banks' objective function. 
For any portfolio of investment projects Q E 13, its return R(Q) can 
be obtained by integrating the function R(a) over Q with respect to ;\: 
R(Q) = f R(a)d;\(a) = [f OaO-1d;\(a)] exP((J"Z-(J"Z/2) .  
Q Q 
I assume that the quality of a project can be observed by the 
entrepreneur as well as by the bankers, who have the appropriate 
5 screening technology. Bankers compete in order to obtain the best 
projects. As systematic risk affects equally all projects, they must 
yield the same expected rate of return, whatever the preference of banks 
towards risk. 6 Let r denote the (endogenous) rate of return on risky 
A 
projects, and let P(a) represent the (also endogenous)  market value of 
4 This is consistent with modern theories of financial intermediation 
which rest partially upon diversification arguments (Leland and Pyle, 
1977; Diamond, 1984) .  
5 Theories of financial intermediation remark the role of the 
intermediaries in collecting information. According to Diamond ( 1984) 
fixed costs linked to information seeking together with diversification 
can justify why screening and monitoring are delegated to an 
intermediary. 
6 Bankers are risk-neutral, 
risk-taking. 
but limited liability may encourage 
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project a E IR . Then we have: + 
P(a) = E [l�. ( a ) l  l + r  
A 




From the point of view of the entrepreneur, project a is profitable 
only if P(a) covers the unit investment which is necessary to carry it 
out. If P(a)  is greater than 1, the promoter can sell the future returns 
of the project, invest one unit in it and obtain a non-negative profit 
equal to P(a)-l. Therefore, entrepreneurs with P(a)�l sell their 
projects in the stock market. 
Condition P(a)�l determines the set of projects which are 
undertaken for a given I' : 
A 
I 0-1 Q(r ) == {aelR oa �(1+r )} = 
A + A 
This gives the following investment function: 
I(r ) == i\(Q(r ) )  = [ ( 1+r )/or1/(1-
0). 
A A A 
Clearly, Hr ) is a decreasing function of the rate of return r . 
A A 
(2) 
For a given r ,  only the entrepreneurs with projects in Q(r ) sell 
A A 
stock. The aggregate market value of these projects is: 
A(r ) == J P(a)di\(a ) .  
A Q(r ) 
A 
Substituting P(a)  from (1 )  into this equation and integrating over Q(a)  
gives: 
A(r ) = (lIo )[ (1+r )/o rll(l-O) . 
A A 
The aggregate (random) return of these projects is given by: 
(3) 
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� 2 O+r )A(r )exp(liz-Ii 12) .  
A A 
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(4  ) 
From (2) and (3) ,  entrepreneurs' profits (and consumption) at t=O are: 
A(r ) - I(r ) = 0-0) A(r ) .  
A A A 
So, entrepreneurs' consumption is a fraction 0-0) of the funds obtained 
by selling their projects. 
In section 3, I will characterize the equilibrium in the stock 
market by putting together equation (3) and the banks' demand for risky 
assets. 
2.2. Depositors. 
There is a representative risk-neutral depositor with an initial wealth 
normalized to unity that can be invested in the safe asset, B, or in 
bank deposits, D. His budget constraint is given by: 
B + D = l. (5)  
Deposits are completely insured (principal plus interest) by the deposit 
insurance fund, so they are riskless. In addition to their return, r n' 
they provide some transaction and liquidity services. These services are 
modeled in a reduced form approach by introducing a function U(D) that 
assigns to each amount of deposits the value at t=O of the 
transaction-liquidity . 7 serVIces. Thus, the depositor's 
function ( in terms of utility at t=O can be written as: 
objective 
7 In their famous article, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an explicit 
modeling of this liquidity services in a multi -period setting with 
ex-post heterogeneous agents. 
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(1+r )B + (1+r )D + ( 1+r )U(D) ,  
B D B 
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(6 )  
where U(D) is  assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, concave 
and increasing, with U' (0 )=1 and U/ O)=O. 
Substituting (5) into (6)  gives the following objective function: 
( 1+r ) - (r -r )D + ( 1+r )U(D) .  
B B D B 
From the properties of U(D),  the demand for deposits is positive for 'all 
r >-1, and for r <r satisfies the following first order condition: D D B 
( 1+r lU' (D) = r -r . 
B B D 
(7)  
From here we obtain a deposit demand function which depends 
(negatively) on (r -r )/( l+r ) .  This term will be later defined as the 
B D B 
bank intermediation margin on deposits, /J. .  For r �r , all the wealth of 
D D B 
depositors is invested in bank deposits. 
2.3. Bankers. 
Banks belong to a class of risk-neutral agents called bankers. A 
representative bank and a representative banker are considered. The 
banker has an initial wealth K that is invested in banking capital. She 
also has a screening technology to evaluate (at zero cost) the quality 
of investment projects. 
At t=O the banker sets up the bank, which entails choosing first 
its deposits, Do' and next its asset composition. In taking deposits, 
banks incur in two different costs at t=O, namely the deposit insurance 
premium and some intermediation costs. The intermediation costs are 
linked (again in a reduced form) to the provision of transaction and 
liquidity services to depositors. Deposit insurance premiums and costs 
are assumed to be linear functions of Do ' denoted pDo and cDo '  
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respecti vely. 
Two kinds of assets are available to banks: risky assets -which are 
the shares in risky projects that have been analyzed in section 2. 1- and 
the riskless asset. Ao and Bo stand respectively for the amounts 
invested in such assets. Then, the bank's budget constraint at t=O has 
the following structure: 
A + B + (p+c) D = D + K. o 0 0 0 (8)  
Banks have limited liability and deposits are fully insured. At t=l 
asset returns are observed and the net worth of the bank, A +B -D . is 1 1 1 
computed, where B and D stand, respectively, for the values of the 1 1 
riskless asset and the deposits at t=1. · If the net worth is negative, 
the DIA closes the bank, pays off depositors and, as receiver, 
liquidates the bank's assets. If positive, the bank liquidates its 
assets and pays off depositors. The residual worth accrues to the 
banker. Therefore, the value of the bank to the banker at t=l is given 
by: 
v - max{A +B -D , O}. 
1 1 1 1 
The banker is assumed to maximize her expected wealth at t=l, E(V ) .  1 
As stated by Black and Scholes ( 1973) , many corporate claims under 
limited liability present option-like payoff functions. In this sense, 
V can be interpreted as the payoff of . a call option on the bank's risky 1 
portfolio with strike price D -B (see Figure O .  Given the stochastic 
1 1 
properties of the returns of the risky projects -see equation (4)-,  the 
value of the risky portfolio at t=1 is a log-normally distributed random 
variable: 
� � 2 A = ( 1+r )A exp(O'z-O' 12) .  1 A 0 
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FIGURE 1 
Value of a bank as a function of the return on risky assets 
V 1 































D -B / 1 1 
v =max{A +B -D , O} 1 1 1 1 
A 1 
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But then the computation of E(V ) leads to a simple variation of the 1 . 
standard Black-Scholes formula for the valuation of call options.8,9 
Let us define 
v - E(V ) = SOO max{A +B -D , 0}g(A )dA , 1 1 0  1 1 1  1 1  (9 )  
where g( . )  is  the density function of A .  When D >B , several changes of 1 1 1 
variable make it possible to write the integral in equation (9 )  in terms 
pf the distribution function of a standard normal random variable, 
F( · ) : 10 
v = (l+r )A F(x) - (D -B )F(x-o-) 1 A 0 1 1 (10) 
where 
x ==  I(D -B ) ]+log(1+r )+0-2/2] . 0- 0 1 1 A 
The definition of x is such that A +B -D is positive when z>o--x; 1 1 1 
therefore, F(x-o-)=!-F(o--x) stands for the probability of the bank being 
solvent. From equation ( 10 ) ,  we can deduct that the expected value of 
8 The Black-Scholes formula can be obtained in a risk-neutral 
discrete-time setting precisely by assuming that the value of the 
underlying asset is log-normally distributed and calculating the 
expected present value of V . 1 
9 Merton ( 1977) applied option theory to the valuation of the deposit 
insurance contract, opening an interesting line of research. Marcus and 
Shaked ( 1984) ,  Ronn and Verma ( 1986) and Mullins and Pyle (1990) are 
good examples. Surprisingly, however, few behavioral models exploit the 
resulting valuation formulas (see Suarez, 1993) .  
10 See Suarez (1993) for a detailed derivation. 
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the bank to bankers comes from subtracting the expected value of its net 
debt from the expected value of its portfolio of risky assets. Because 
of limited liability, the value of this portfolio, ( l+r )A F(x), results 
A 0 
from computing the mean of the truncated log-normal random variable that 
yields A in non-bankruptcy states and zero otherwise. On the other 
1 
hand, the expected value of the bank' s net debt is simply (D -B ) times 
1 1 
the probability of the bank being solvent. Since the representative bank 
takes the deposit rate r as given, D =(l+r )D . Similarly, B =( I+r )B . D 1 D O  1 8 0 
When D ::;B ,  the bank cannot fail and V is simply the expected net 
1 1 1 
worth of the bank: 
V = ( l+r )A - ( l+r )D - ( l+r )B . 
1 A 0 D 0 8 0 
( 11 )  
Observe that ( 11)  can be obtained by setting F(x)=F(x-O')�l in ( 10) .  
Next, I will obtain an expression for the banker' s  objective 
function in terms of the following two decision variables: the share of 
risky assets in the total assets of the bank, cx.=A /(A +B ) ,  and the o 0 0 
amount of deposits, D . Using the budget constraint of the bank (8) ,  we o 
get: 
A = cx.[ (1-p-c)D +K] ,  o 0 
B = ( l-cx.) [ (1-p-c)D +K] .  o 0 
(12) 
( 13 )  
Intermediation margins play a central role in the model. Define the 
intermediation margin on risky assets, Il ,  as the discounted value of 
A 




of return, (r -r )I(l+r ) ,  
A 8 8 
and define 
deposits, IlD, as the discounted value 






(r -r )/(1 +r ) .  8 D 8 
The bank is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that it takes Il A and 
Il as given. D 
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As r is exogenously given, maximIzmg V is B 1 
maximizing its present value, -1 V =( 1+r ) V .  
O B I 
Then, from 
and previous definitions, the objective function of the 




(12) and ( 13 ) ,  
bank can be 
( 15) 
The regulatory framework faced by the bank consists of the deposit 
insurance premium and a capital requirement. The portfolio decision of 
the bank, however, is taken once deposits have been raised, the deposit 
insurance premium has been paid and the capital requirement has been 
imposed and verified. As a consequence, neither the deposit insurance 
premium nor the capital requirement can be sensitive to the composition 
of the bank portfolio, and a moral hazard problem surges. 
As a matter of fact, full risk-insensitiveness characterized 
banking regulation in many countries until the overall introduction of 
risk-based capital requirements resulting from the Basle Committee 
recommendations (Bank for International Settlements, 1988) .  But even the 
so-called Cooke ratios maintain a high degree of risk-insensitiveness, 
since assets of very different riskiness are included in wide single 
categories. 
Assume, then, that p is a constant and that the capital requirement 
is defined as a minimum ratio k of net capital (capital at t=O net of 
intermediation costs) to total assets: 
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K- ( p+ c ) D o 
A +B o 0 
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� k. ( 16)  
Using the budget constraint of the bank, equation (8) ,  we can rewrite 
( 16 )  as an upper bound on D : o 
   Do ::s D -  K. ( 17 )  
In this classic regulatory framework, the decision problem of the 
bank can be formulated as follows: 
Maximize 
a ,  D o 
subject to: 
v (a,D ) o 0 
O ::s  D ::s D. o 
( 18 )  
Notice that, while the range of variation of a comes directly from its 
definition, the upper bound for D depends upon regulatory parameters. o 
The analysis of this apparently simple optimization program will first 
lead to the characterization of the behavior of banks, and then the 
equilibrium outcome of the economy. 
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS. 
This section is divided into three subsections. First, I analyze the 
behavior of banks. Four basic corner solutions arise because of 
non-convexities in the optimization problem (18 ) .  Each solution can be 
interpreted as one of four possible configurations of the banking 
business: universal banks, investment banks, mutual funds and narrow 
banks. Later on, equilibrium is characterized. The corner solutions lead 
to four possible types of equilibrium, depending upon the relative 
scarcity of bankers wealth (as compared with the investment 
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opportunities and for a given capital requirement) .  In particular, there 
is a type of equilibrium which is the one that one would expect to find 
in the long-run, when the rate of return on bank capital is not higher 
than the risk-free rate and, thus, new capital does not have an 
incentive to be accumulated in the banking industry. The last subsection 
discusses this long-run equilibrium. 
3.1. Behavior of banks. 
Limited liability introduces non-convexities in the decision problem of 
the representative bank (recall Figure 1 ) .  It is well known that, other 
things equal, the value of the banker's  call option over the bank's 
assets is an increasing function of the leverage of the bank and the 
volatility of its assets (Merton, 1977; Keeley and Furlong, 1990) .  Under 
deposit insurance and a classic regulatory framewor�, the banker may 
exploit her limited liability because neither the cost of deposits nor 
regulatory constraints impose higher costs on riskier actions. 
In this model, however, intermediation margins are endogenous and, 
if they were sufficiently low, banks might prefer a conservative policy 
rather than the riskiest feasible one. 
PROPOSITION 1: Under a classic regulatory framework, there are no pure 
interior solutions for 0: and D .  Furthermore, 0<0:<1 implies D =0 and o 0 
O<D <15 implies 0:=0. o 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of the non-convexities 
mentioned above. As in any optimization program with corner solutions, 
we get the optimum by comparing the value of the objective function at 
every possible corner. Such a cumbersome task leads to Figure 2. The 
space of intermediation margins, (IJ.A,IJ.O) ,  is divided into four regions 
(denoted A, B, C and D) ,  each corresponding to a pure corner solution. 
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FIGURE 2 
The behavior of a bank in the regions of the (11 ,p. ) space A D 
B 
(INVE S TMENT 
BANK S )  
a = 1 
D = 0  o 
o 
C ( MUTUAL F UNDS) 
A ( UNIVERSAL BANK S )  
a = 1  
D = D  o 
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a = O  
D = 0  o 
o ( NAR ROW BANKS )  
a = O  
D = D  o 
 
Banking Regulation in an Equilibrium Model 73 
In region A, the solution to the problem of the representative bank 
is 0:=1 and D =15. In region B, 0:=1 and D =0. In region C, 0:=0 and D =0. o 0 0 
Finally, in region D, a=O and D =15. In the frontiers between regions 
o 
( i .  e. : ArlB, AnC, AnD, BnC and CnD) ,  the optimal decisions of the 
neighboring regions are equally optimal. Additionally, o:e(O,l )  and D =0 
o 
is also optimal in BnC, while 0:=0 and D e(O,D) is optimal in CnD. ll 
o 
Appendix 2 contains the details of the derivation of the figure and, in 
particular, the definition of the curves that separate one region from 
another. 
These results are easy to explain. The optimal 0: depends basically 
upon /l ;  it is 1 when /l is high (AvB) and ° when /l is Low (CvD ) .  
A A A 
Similarly, D is 15 when /l is high (AvD) and 0 when it is Low (BvC). The 
o D 
solution in region A corresponds to the case of universaL banks (that 
take deposits in order to fund risky projects ) .  Similarly, the solutions 
in regions B, C and D can be respectively related with investment banks 
(that invest own funds in risky assets) ,  money-market mutuaL funds (that 
invest own funds in safe assets) and narrow banks (that take deposits in 
order to invest in safe assets) .  
The boundary between Do=O and Do=D, ( AvD)n(BvC),  is basically 
determined by intermediation costs. In particular, when a=O is optimal, 
the bank accepts deposits only if /l covers such costs (/l ::=p+cL In 
D D 
contrast, when 0:=1, the reservation margin in deposits decreases as the 
margin in risky assets increases. 
The boundary between 0:=0 and 0:=1, (AvB)n(CvD) ,  reflects the 
attraction of risky assets for banks. When f.l is low and the optimal 
D 
value of D is 0, the criterion for the bank to invest or not in risky 
o 
11 Note that in AnB, AnC and AnD the solution is either the one in A or 
the respective one in B, C and D, but not intermediate values of 0: and 
D .  
o 
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assets is simply given by fl �O. In contrast, when fl is greater than a 
A D 
certain critical value, there exists a set of intermediation margins 
fl <0 for which D =15 and 0:=1 are optimal (the area of region A that is A 0 
under the horizontal axis in Figure 2) .  
This finding is  crucial to understand one of the key results of 
this paper. Because of limited liability and the ability to borrow at a 
fixed rate, the bank may find attractive the investment in risky assets 
even when their expected rate of return is below the risk-free rate. If 
the probability of failure is positive, very high outcomes of A are to 
1 
the benefit of the bank, whilst very low outcomes are to the detriment 
of the deposit insurance fund. High intermediation margins in deposits 
reduce the set of states in which the bank fails and, hence, ameliorate 
(but do not eliminate) the bias towards risky assets (see Figure 2) .  
3.2. Characterization of equilibrium. 





) ,  such that: ( i )  agents maximize their objective functions 
subject to their budgetary and regulatory constraints, Oi) markets 
clear. 
As r is exogenously given (and, therefore, the supply of the 
B 
riskless asset is perfectly elastic) ,  we shall focus on the markets for 
risky assets and deposits. The asset supply function A(r ) ,  defined in 
A 
equation (3) ,  and the deposit demand function D(r , r ) ,  defined in 
D B 
equation (7) ,  can be rewritten as functions of fl ,  fl and r :  A(fl ,r  ) 
A D B A B 
and D{fl ) .  Then (fl ,fl ) is a pair 
D A D  
if A(fl ,r  )=A and D(fl )=D . 
A B O D 0 
of equilibrium intermediation margins 
PROPOSITION 2: There cannot be an equilibrium in the region 
(BvCvD ),\A. 
Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that an equilibrium exists in 
(BvCvD)'\A. Then either a=O or D =0 would characterize the behavior of o 
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the representative bank. ex=O means A =0 and hence A(1l ,r )=0. The supply o A B 
of risky assets is zero only if 11 tends towards infinity. But in such A 
case ex=O is not an optimal choice for the bank (see Figure 2) .  
Similarly, D =0 means D(1l )=0, but the demand for deposits is  zero only o D 
if 11 tends towards 1, and in such case D =0 is not an optimal decision 
D 0 
f or the bank. [J 
From Proposition 2, equilibrium, if it exists, should take place in 
the interior of region A, Int(A), or in its frontier, A\lnt(A) .  
Intermediation margins in A \lnt(A) make the representative banker 
indifferent between at least two solutions (two possible configurations 
of the bank) .  The representative bank hypothesis must then be removed, 
because in equilibrium a fraction "1 of the banking industry may choose 
one solution, while the remaining 1-"1 may choose the other. 12 In what 
follows, let D* represent the aggregate banking supply of deposits and o . 
A* the aggregate banking demand for risky assets. K will stand for the o 
aggregate capital capacity of the banking industry. I will distinguish 
four types of equilibrium. 
(0 Equilibrium of type I: (11 ,11 ) e Int(A).  A D 
Any possible equilibrium in Int(A) implies ex=1 and D =15 for all banks o 
(all banks are universal banks) '  Therefore, D*=15 and A*=[ ( 1-p-c)15+Kl=A. o 0 
The corresponding market clearing pair will be such that A(1l ,r )=A and A B 
D(1l )=D. Note the recursive nature of this equilibrium. 
D 
(ii) Equilibrium of type II: (11 ,11 ) e AnB. A D 
Assume that a fraction "1 of the banking industry chooses ex=1 and Do =15, 
while the remaining 1-0 chooses a=1 and D =0. Clearly, D*=oD and o 0 
A*="1( 1-p-c)D+K. Furthermore, as "1 varies, any allocation such that o 
D*e[O,Dl and A*=( I-p-c)D*+K is compatible with the optimizing behavior o 0 0 
12 The argument could be extended to situations where more than two 
solutions are optimal, as in AnBnC and MCnD. 
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of banks. The market clearing pair will be such that: 
A(IJ. ,r ) = (1-p-c )D(1J. )+K and D(IJ. ) � D. 
A B O 0 ( 19)  
(iii) Equil ibrium of type III: (IJ. ,IJ. ) E A('\C. 
A 0 
Assume that a fraction '0 of the banking industry chooses a=l and Do =D, 
while the remaining 1-'0 chooses a=O and D =0. Clearly, D*='OD and A*='OA. 
o 0 0 
Using the definition of D in ( 17) ,  we get that A=[ ( 1-p-c)D+K] equals 
[ lI(l-k) ]D and, hence, 
will be such that: 
A*=[1I0-k) lD*. 
o 0 
Then, the market clearing pair 
A(IJ. ,r ) - -1
1
k D(IJ. ) and D(IJ. ) � D. A B - 0 0 
(iv) EquiHbrium of type IV: (IJ. , Il  ) E A('\D. 
A 0 
(20 )  
Suppose that a fraction '0 of the banking industry chooses a=1 and Do =15, 
while the remaining 1-'0 chooses a=O and D =D. Clearly, D*=D and o 0 
A*='O[ lI( l-k) ]D. The market clearing pair will be such that: 
o 
D(IJ. ) = D and A(IJ. ,r ) � A. 
D A B 
(21) 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of these four types of 
equilibrium. The expected returns on banking capital exceed the 
risk-free rate in equilibria of types I, II and IV, while equal the 
risk-free rate in type III equilibrium. To see this, note that in type 
III equilibrium banks are indifferent between (a,D )=(1,5) 
o 
and 
(a,D )=(0 ,0) ;  with (0,0)  bankers invest all their wealth in the riskless o 
asset, which yields r .  In the other types of equilibrium (0,0) is no 
B 
longer optimal. Therefore, in equilibria of types I, II and IV the 
expected return on bankers' wealth is greater than r .  For the sake of 
B 
simplicity, we had previously assumed that bankers invested all their 
wealth in bank capital and, hence, that K was exogenously given. 
However, these results imply that the bankers do not regret this 
decision. In equilibrium, wealth invested in bank capital always yields 
at least the same expected return that a privately held portfolio of the 
safe asset. 
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TABLE 1 
Description of Each Type of Equilibrium 
Type I 
- All banks are universal banks. 
- Expected returns on banking capital exceed the risk-free rate. 
- Over- or under-investment in risky assets are possible. 
Type II 
- Universal banks and investment banks co-exist. 
- Expected returns on banking capital exceed the risk-free rate. 
Under-investment in risky assets. 
Type III 
- Universal banks and mutual funds co-exist. 
- Expected returns on banki.ng capital equal the risk-free rate. 
- Over-investment in risky assets. 
Type IV 
- Universal banks and narrow banks co-exist. 
- Expected returns on banking capital exceed the risk-free rate. 
- Over-investment in risky assets. 
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The efficient allocation of wealth under perfect information in 
this economy would require ,.,. =0. With ,.,. <0, net economic gains could be 
A A 
obtained by denying finance to risky projects whose expected return is 
lower than r and investing these funds in the safe asset. Similarly, 
B 
with ,.,. >0, unfunded risky projects yield higher expected returns than 
A 
the riskless asset and, except if all wealth were already invested in 
risky assets, net gains could be obtained by funding additional 
investment projects. These arguments lead to the over- and 
under-investment results in Table 1. 
3.3. The long-run equilibrium. 
Equilibrium of type III is in a sense the one that we might expect to 
find in the long-run. With perfect capital markets, the extraordinary 
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returns obtained by banks in the other types of equilibrium would 
. attract new capital into the banking industry. In this paper, I have 
assumed, however, that banking capital is scarce. In fact, I have 
supposed that it is limited to the initial wealth of bankers, implicitly 
discarding the possibility of raising additional capital in the 
short-run. Notwithstanding, appealing to external finance is not 
necessary to argue that, in the long-run, banks can obtain additional 
capital, since excess returns on existing own funds can provide 
simultaneously the incentives and the funds for capital accumulation in 
the banking industry. In the next section, I will examine the effect of 
increases in K on each type of equilibrium. The results support a very 
plausible convergence of the other types of eqUilibrium towards the type 
III. Accordingly, if the initial situation corresponded to an 
equilibrium of type I, II or IV, competitive banks would accumulate 
capital up to the point in which excess returns on own funds vanished. 
In this long-run equilibrium Il is smaller than zero. Therefore the 
A 
investment in risky assets exceeds the first best. Too many projects are 
financed and a clear distributional effect accompanies this efficiency 
loss. Risky projects are over-valued, to the benefit of entrepreneurs 
and the detriment of the deposit insurance fund. Contrary to models of 
deposit insurance pricing or banking behavior where r and r are 
A 0 
exogenously given and rents from the limited liability put option are 
appropriated by banks as a simple wealth transfer, in this long-run 
eqUilibrium banking competition transfers the implicit subsidy to 
entrepreneurs causing both efficiency losses and distributional 
effects. 13 
13 Informal discussion by regulators and other observers has long 
implicitly recognized both impacts, but the first formal statement is in 
Gennotte (1990) .  See also Gennotte and Pyle ( 1991 ) .  
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4. COMPARATIVE STATICS. 
Comparative static results in this model will show how changes in the 
capital endowment of banks K, the capital requirement k, the deposit 
insurance premium p, the risk of real investment projects cr, and the 
safe rate of return r affect the endogenous variables. We are 
B 
interested in their impact on the equilibrium intermediation margins, 
the investment in risky projects, the aggregate supply of deposits, and 
the solvency of banks. 
Notice that given the specification of the deposit demand function 
and the asset supply function, variations in the aggregate levels of 
investment in risky projects and deposits can be directly related 
(except when r varies) to changes in /l and /l , respectively. 
B A D  
The effects on the solvency of banks can be examined by 
differentiating the probability of failure, q=F(cr-x) ,  of those banks 
that take deposits in order to invest in risky projects (universal 
banks) ;  the other banks are safe. In order to evaluate q, notice that 
when a=l and D =5 the expression for x reduces to: o 
x ==  )-log(l+k)-log(1-/l )+cr72] , cr A D (22)  
so that q is decreasing in /l ,  /l and k, and increasing in cr.  As the A D 
equilibrium intermediation margins are endogenous variables, we can 
distinguish between the direct effect on q of a parameter w, BqlBw 
(which is computed holding constant Ii and Ii ) , and the final effect, 
A D 
dq/dw (which takes also into account the changes in IiA and liD) .  
Comparing both effects is interesting because previous research has 
focused mainly on the direct effects, treating /l and /l as exogenous. A D 
Duplicated signs in the tables of results will appear when the indirect 
effects reinforce the direct ones. 
Comparative statics results in this model are contingent on the 
type of equilibrium. Nevertheless, many results are robust. In type I 
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equilibrium, the exercise is recursive because 15 and A are determined by 
regulatory and structural parameters through the optimal balance sheet 
of the bank, while 11 and 11 are subsequently derived by solving the A D 
market clearing conditions A(1l , r  )=A and D(1l )=15. Differentiating the A B D 
corresponding equations with respect to the parameters of interest and 
the endogenous variables leads to the results. In the other types of 
equilibrium, the exercise is not recursive, but follows the standard 
procedure. 
Instead of describing the results for the four types of 
equilibrium, I will show first the results referring to the change in . K, 
that support the convergence of the other types of equilibrium towards 
type III. Afterwards, I will focus on this long-run equilibrium, leaving 
the details of the others for Appendix 3. 
4.1. The capital endowment of banks and the convergence result. 
Only in type III equilibrium, the aggregate ' capital endowment of the 
banking industry is not binding. Bank capital yields no excess returns 
and bankers are, consequently, indifferent between investing their 
wealth in banks or holding a safe portfolio. Small changes in K do not 
modify the equilibrium outcome. This is not the case in the other types 
of equilibrium, where the presence of K in the equilibrium conditions 
reflects, on the one hand, that increases in K enhance the capacity of 
the industry to take deposits and invest in risky assets, and, on the 
other, that at least one of these activities is profitable. In these 
types of equilibrium, bank capital obtains expected returns that exceed 
r .  
B 
To see how changes in K modify the short-run equilibrium outcomes, 
notice that K enters the equilibrium conditions but does not have any 
influence in the shape of the regions of bank behavior in the (11 ,11 ) A D 
space (see Appendix 2) .  Thus, changes in K move the pair of equilibrium 
margins over Figure 2, without changing the location of the frontiers. 
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In type I equilibrium, a rise in K increases both D and A, allows 
the expansion of pure banking activities and leads to smaller margins in 
both deposits and risky assets. Table 2 shows these effects as well as 
the direct and final impacts on the probability of failure. The first is 
null, but the second is clearly positive. 
TABLE 2 
Changing the Capital Endowment of Banks (K) 
Type of d/l A d/l D aq dq 
equil  i brium dK dK aK dK 
I 0 + 
II + 0 ? 
IV 0 + 
In type II equilibrium, the market clearing conditions summarized 
by A(/l ,r  )=(1-p-c )D(/l )+K establish a positive relationship between the A B D 
margins on deposits and risky assets. An increase in K shifts this curve 
down to the right, which implies a lower /l and a higher /l . The descent A D 
along the boundary between regions A and B reflects, on the one hand, 
greater investment in risky projects and, on the other, a lower supply 
of deposits. As /l and /l move in opposite directions, the final impact A D 
of K on q is ambiguous in this case. 
Intuitively, in the initial situation, risky assets are 
sufficiently profitable to attract the investment of any additional 
amount of capital, but the intermediation margin on deposits is small 
enough to dissuade investment banks from becoming universal banks and 
using deposits to invest in risky assets. When K goes up, investment 
rises. As investment rises, /l A falls and the profitability of universal 
banks at prior /In deteriorates. The consequent rise in J.l.D indicates that 
some universal banks become investment banks, abandoning the 
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deposit-taking activity. 
In type IV equilibrium, market clearing conditions are summarized 
by D(1l ) = D. An increase in K augments D and the aggregate supply of n 
deposits. The resulting fall in Iln increases the probability of 
bankruptcy and the incentives to invest in risky assets. Thus some 
narrow banks become universal banks, lowering 11 
A 
and rising the 
investment in risky projects. 
These results imply that increases in K lead the pair of 
equilibrium margins in any type of equilibrium towards the frontier 
between regions A and C, i .e. the locus where equilibrium of type III 
takes place (see the arrows in Figure 2). Therefore, as argued in 
section 3.3, the incentives to accumulate bank capital given by the 
excess returns on own funds in · equilibria of types I, II and IV can lead 
to a convergence of these equilibria towards the long-run equilibrium, 
where bank capital yields an expected return equal to the risk-free 
rate. 
4.2. Comparative statics in the long-run equilibrium. 
As derived in Appendix 2, the boundary between regions A and C is the 
downward sloping curve defined by the following equation: 
whereas the market clearing conditions summarized in (20)  establish: 
which defines an upward sloping curve in the (11 ,Il ) space. Equilibrium 
A n 
of type III corresponds to the intersection between these curves and 
comparative statics can be diagrammatically obtained by analyzing the 
movement of both curves and the consequent shift in their intersection. 
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Total differentiation of these equations leads to: 
and 
+ + + 
r ) = 0, 
B 
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respectively. The signs of the partial derivatives are written below the 
corresponding variables and parameters. Table 3 contains the results. 
Question marks stand for ambiguous signs and duplicated signs appear in 
the last column when the indirect effects on the probability of failure 
reinforce the direct ones. 
TABLE 3 
Comparative Statics in the Long-Run Equilibrium 
Parameter dll A dll D 8 q  d q  
( w )  dW dw aw dW 
k ? + 
P + + ° 
(J' + ++ 
r + ° ? 
B 
Changes in the capital requirement. A more stringent capital requirement 
has a clear contractionary impact on the market for deposits and lowers 
the probability of failure of risky banks. 
An increase in k shifts G up to the right and H down to the right. 
The movement of G is justified by the fall in the profitability of 
universal banks that follows from the reduction of the deposit insurance 
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subsidy when leverage declines. The shift in H reflects that, with a 
higher capital ratio, . less deposits are necessary to fund a given amount 
of risky assets: a greater I-l is compatible with a given I-l .  The net o A 
impact on I-lo is unambiguously positive, but the one on I-l A might be 
negative. In spite of this ambiguity, q can be shown to decrease. 
Changes in the deposit insurance premium. A rise in p leads to greater 
intermediation margins and lowers the probability of bankruptcy. 
For a given amount of deposits, an increase in p rises the payments 
to the deposit insurance agency, diminishing the funds available . to 
invest in both assets. Thus higher p decreases the profitability of 
depository institutions, moving the frontier between regions with D =0 o 
and D =5 to the right. The market clearing condition does not change. 
o 
So, an increase in p rises intermediation margips, curtailing 'the 
funding of risky projects and the supply of deposits. Although p lacks a 
direct effect on q due to the specification in net terms of the capital 
requirement, the indirect effects are negative and lead to a smaller 
probability of failure. 
Changes in the risk of real investment projects. Diagrammatically, 
increasing the volatility of the returns of risky investment 
opportunities (the systematic risk) shifts the boundary between regions 
A and C down to the left. Thereby, intermediation margins decline and 
the probability of bankruptcy goes up. 
Intuitively, when available investment projects become riskier, the 
implicit subsidy to risk-taking rises and banking activity becomes more 
profitable. Banks get involved in strong competition both as suppliers 
of deposits and demanders of risky assets. At previous intermediation 
margins markets are no longer in equilibrium. The new equilibrium yields 
lower margins, further investment in risky assets and the expansion of 
deposits. According to (22) ,  the probability of bankruptcy augments not 
only as a direct consequence of higher IT but also because of reduced 
margins in both sides of the banks' balance sheet. 
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Changes in the safe rate of return. Changes in r has non-symmetric 
B 
effects on intermediation margins and may affect the solvency of banks, 
al though, as expected, a rise in r has a contractionary impact on 
B 
investment and deposit supply. 
Analyzing the effects of the change in r is interesting, because 
B 
it may account for monetary policy, whose transmission is influenced by 
financial intermediation. The analysis is notably simplified by the fact 
that the boundaries between the regions of Figure 2 are invariant to 
changes in r . 
B 
For a given pair of intermediation margins, higher r reduces the 
B 
set of profitable investment projects, whilst keeps constant the demand 
for deposits, and hence the funding capacity of the banking industry. 
The H curve shifts down to the right so that previous intermediation 
margins violate the market clearing condition and re-establishing the 
equilibrium entails the simultaneous decrease of f.lA and increase of f.lD• 
SO, the rise in r has a contractionary impact on both A* and D*, though 
B 
the effect on intermediation margins is not symmetric (recall that the 
supply of risky assets depends on both f.l and r so that the fall in 
A B 
investment is compatible with the decrease in f.l ) . The impact on q is A 
unclear, because f.l and f.l move in opposite directions. A D 
4.3. Comparative statics in short-run equilibria. 
Most of the results discussed for the long-run equilibrium are robust 
and the detailed description of the . results for the other types of 
equilibrium will not be given here. The reader can find them in Appendix 
3. Nevertheless, two particular comments are worthy. 
First, out of the long-run equilibrium, the effect of a rise in k 
on the market for risky assets is unambiguously contractionary, since 
the banking industry suffers capital shortage and cannot respond with an 
increase in K. So the effects of capital regulation on real investment 
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should be specially important when capital market imperfections impede 
bankers to raise capital. In this sense, recent experiences of Japan and 
US banking systems in implementing the capital standards set by the Bank 
for International Settlements indicate that the new requirements have 
been met at least in the short-run by cutting asset growth, as predicted 
here. 
Second, in short-run equilibria the capital endowment of banks 
ent.ers the equilibrium conditions. This means that market outcomes are 
influenced by capital shortage. In equilibrium of type I, for instance, 
all the industry takes deposits and invests in risky assets, so that D* o 
and A* are as high as the availability of capital permits. The same is o 
true for deposits in equilibrium of type IV. As a consequence, in 
short-run equilibria, changes in parameters such as (J and r -which do 
B 
not modify the banks' capacity to take deposits or invest in risky 
assets- do not cause strong variations in /l and /l .  So, out of the A D 
long-run equilibrium, the effects of changes in systematic risk and the 
safe rate of return are generally lower than in the long-run equilibrium 
examined above. 
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
This paper has analyzed banking prudential regulation in an equilibrium 
model. In the model, banks play a role in financing heterogeneous risky 
investment projects whose original owners lack financial resources to 
undertake them. Banks can evaluate the quality of projects and, if 
adequate, they can provide funding for them. Banks have limited 
liability and deposits are fully insured. Deposits provide some 
transaction and liquidity services to depositors, so they are willing to 
accept rates of return below the risk-free rate. 
Bankers invest all their wealth in bank capital and seek to 
maximize the expected present value of their investment subject to the 
regulatory constraints. Taking the rates of return as given, banks 
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choose the amount of deposits, D ,  and the share of risky assets in 
. 0 
their portfolio, (x. The behavior of banks is determined by 
intermediation margins on risky assets, J.l.A' and deposits, J.l.D' The 
optimal ex. depends roughly on J.l. ,  whilst the optimal D depends upon J.l.D' A 0 
Because of limited liability and the opportunity to borrow at a fixed 
rate, banks may find attractive the investment in risky assets even when 
their expected rate of return is below the risk-free rate. 
Unlike in the previous literature, intermediation margins are 
�ndogenous. Four types of equilibrium can be identified. Each one 
corresponds to particular corner solutions to the problem of the 
representative bank that are linked to meaningful configurations of the 
banking industry, whose plausibility depends upon the scarcity of bank 
capital. However, there exists a type of equilibrium which is, in a 
sense, the one that we would expect to find in the long run, when the 
rate of return on bank capital is not higher than the risk-free rate and 
new capital does not have an incentive to enter or to be accumulated in 
the banking industry. In this long run equilibrium, the expected return 
on risky assets is lower than the risk-free rate and an over-investment 
result follows . . Banking competition passes through the deposit insurance 
subsidy to financial markets, causing not only distributional effects 
but also deadweight losses. 
Comparative static results show that the classical regulatory 
instruments and, in particular, capital requirements may be quite 
effective in solvency regulation. Its clear contractionary impact on the 
market for deposits yields a wider intermediation margin in deposits 
that reinforces the direct effect of lower leverage on the probability 
of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, care should be paid to the consequences of 
more stringent capital standards on real investment and on the provision 
of liquidity services via deposits, especially when, because of capital 
market imperfections, the banking industry suffers capital shortage and 
a credit crunch threatens. 
Under a given risk-insensitive regulation, shifts in the systematic 
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risk (I which affects investment projects may dramatically change the 
well-functioning, safety and soundness of the banking system. If, for 
instance, (I goes up, the implicit subsidy to risk-taking rises and 
banking activity becomes more profitable, boosting competition for risky 
assets and deposits. Intermediation margins decline and the solvency of 
banks drops because of the twofold effects (direct and via equilibrium 
margins ) of higher volatility of asset values. 
This model may help to explain the recent solvency problems of the 
savings and loan institutions in U. S. In particular, the higher 
systematic risk of the late seventies and early eighties (higher (I) and 
the inadequate response of the regulator -which included shoring up book 
value net worth with a variety of accounting changes and reducing 
minimum regulatory capital requirements (decreasing k)- could joined 
short-term factors (poor realizations of z) to trigg�r off the debacle 
of the mid eighties. Detailed descriptions of the process given by the 
U. S. Department of the Treasury ( 1991) are consistent with the results 
predicted by this model (higher investment in risky assets and lower 
intermediation margins) .  Some empirical evidence also offers support to 
this interpretation (see Cole, McKenzie and White, 1992) .  
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APPENDIX 1: Proof of Proposition 1. 
The objective function of the representative bank ( 14) depends on a and 
D . When the investment in safe assets is great enough to guarantee the o 
payment of the depositors' claims (Le. , when ( l+r )B �(l+r )D ) , B O D 0 the 
probability of failure of the representative bank q is zero. Let us 
define am ) as the maximum a which implies a zero probability of o 
failure for a given value of D .  Using ( l3 )  and the definition of /.l. ,  o D 
a(D ) can be defined by: o 
(l-a) [ ( 1-p-c)D +Kl=(1-/.l. )D . o D 0 
a(D ) is decreasing and convex in D and takes the value 1 when D =0. 0 0 0 
This function separates the region of the feasible set where q=O ftom 
the one where q>O (see Figure AI) .  
The proof of the result will be done in three steps. First, I will show 
that there is no solution (a' ,D' ) with O<a' <1 and a'>a.(D' ) .  Afterwards, 
I will prove that (a' ,D' ) with O<a'<1 and a'�(i(D' ) cannot be optimal, 
except with D'=O. Finally, we will see that (l ,D' ) with O<D'<D can be 
discarded too. 
( i )  Suppose that (a' ,D' ) with O<a'<1 is a solution to the problem of the 
bank, and suppose also that a'>a(D' ) so that q'>O. The corresponding 
first order condition (FOe) implies: 14 
14 Notice that V as the Black-Scholes formula has the interesting o 
property that its partial derivative with respect to x is zero. 
(AI) 
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Under (Al l ,  the expression for V (a' ,D' ) is o 
V o(a' ,D' ) = [( l-P-ClD'+K-( l-IlD)D'] F(x-cr) 
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(A2) 
which should be greater than K and hence positive, since the bank could 
have chosen (a,D )=(0,0) that yields V =K. Let f(x) be the density o 0 
function of a standard normal distribution. The second partial 
derivative of V with respect to a can be written as: o 
At a' , we have: 
(A3 )  
since (AI )  implies ( 1+11 )=F(x-cr)/F(x). Expression (A3) is negative, A 
since f( · )/F( . ) is the survival function of a standard normal random 
variable, which is a decreasing function. On the other hand, from the 
definition of x we can deduct that the sign of axlaa at D' is that of 
( l-IlD)D'-( l-p-c)D' -K, which from (A2) is negative. 
a2v I aa2 is positive and, hence, a' is not a maximum. o 
Consequently, 
( ii l  Suppose, next, that a'�aCD' ) so that q'=O. For a given D' and 
a�aCD ' ) , V (a,D' ) is a linear function of a. If a'<a(D' ) ,  then the o 
following first order condition holds: 
av o 
-
= 11 = O. 8a A (A4) 
and aCD' ) is also a solution to the problem of the bank. However, for 
any a>a(D' ), we have F(x)<1, F(x-cr)<1 and F(x» F(x-cr) .  Under (A4) ,  the 
right partial derivative of V at aCD' ) is strictly positive. Therefore, o 
neither a(D' ) nor a' can be a maximum, except when a(D' )=l (Le.  D'=O) .  
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If a' =a(D' ) ,  av laa is non-negative at a' and similar arguments can be o 
used to prove that (a' ,D' ) cannot be a maximum except when D'=O. 
(iii ) Solutions in the interior of the feasible set have been discarded 
above (see Figure AI ) ;  solutions in its East boundary has been discarded 
as well. Now I will show that solutions in the North boundary (excluding 
the corners) can also be discarded. Suppose that (I ,D' ) with O<D'<D is a 
solution to the problem of the bank. The corresponding first order 
,condition implies: 
(l+ll ) ( 1-p-c)F(x)-O-1l )F(x-a) = o. A D (AS )  
On the other hand, 
(A6) 
As (AS)  implies O+IlAHI-p-c)F(X)/F(x-a-)=(I-lln ) ,  the value of the first 
term in the right hand side of (A6 ) at D' equals: 
(A7) 
Expression (A7) and ax/aD are strictly negative and, hence, D' is not a o 
maximum. 
Therefore, optimal solutions to the problem of the representative bank 
will be found either in the top right corner of the feasible set or in 
its West and South boundaries .D  
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APPENDIX 2: The behavior of banks in the (Il ,Il ) space. A D 
From Proposition 1, we can restrict our attention to the following sets 
of solutions: ( i )  a=1 and D =15, ( ii )  a=1 and D =0, ( iii) a=O and D =0, 0 0 0 
( iv) a=O and D =15 (v) ae(O, O and D =0, (vi) a=O and D e(O,D) .  o ' 0 0 
Under D =0, V is a linear function of a, hence (v) is optimal only if o 0 
( ii )  and (iii) are also optimal, that is, when banks are indifferent 
between ( ii )  and ( iii) .  Similarly, under a=O, V is a linear function of o 
D ,  hence (vi) is optimal when banks are indifferent between ( iii)  and o 
( iv ) .  Now I must compare 0) ,  ( i i ) ,  ( iii)  and ( iv) .  
Consider first the optimal choice of a for a given value of Do: 
- If D =15, choosing between a=1 or a=O involves -the comparison of o 
V (I ,]) with V (0,15). The representative bank is indifferent between o 0 
both if V ( 1,]))-V (0,15)=0. So using the definition of V (a,D ) in ( 14 )  o 0 0 0 
and noting that from (17) ( l-p-c)D+K=[lI( l+k) ]D, we can obtain: 
[( 1-1l ) [ 1-F(x-0') ]    )F(X) ]] =0. o l-k A (A8 )  
This equation defines an upward sloping curve, GG' , in the space of 
intermediation margins. When Il tends towards 1, Il tends towards zero D A 
and the curve becomes flatter (see Figure A2) . 
- If D =0, choosing between a=1 or a=O involves the comparison of o 
V (1 ,0)  with V (0 ,0) . The sign of V (l ,O)-V (0,0)  depends on Il .  When o 0 0 0 A 
Il >0 ( L e. above the horizontal axis), a=1 is better than a=O. The A 
contrary occurs when Il <0 ( i .e. below the horizontal axis).  A 
So, if D =15 (D =0) the bank will choose a=1 or a=O verifying if (Il ,Il ) o 0 A D 
falls above or below GG' (the horizontal axis) .  As GG' is below the 
horizontal axis, three regions can be considered: ( i )  the region above 
the horizontal axis, ( ii )  the region below GG' , ( iii)  the region between 
the previous two. In the first the optimal value of a is 1; in the 
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FIGURE A2 
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second it is OJ  in the third, the optimal value is 1 if D =D and 0 if o 
D =0. o 
The next step is to characterize the optimal supply of deposits in each 
of these three regions: 
( 0  Region above the horizontal axis. As the optimal IX is 1, the bank 
will be indifferent between D =15 and D =0 if V (l ,D)-V (1 ,0)=0. Noting o 0 0 0 
again. that form ( 17) ( l-p-c)O+K=[lI(l+k) ]O and K=[ lI(l+k)-( l-p-c) 1D, the 
indifference condition can be written as: 
( 1+fJ. ) ( l-p-c)- -(1-fJ. )F(x-<r)=O. [  A l - k D (A9) 
Equation (A9) defines a downward sloping curve, HH' , in the space of 
intermediation margins. D will be 0 at points to the right of HH' and 0 o 
at points to the left. 
(ii)  Region below GG' . As the optimal IX is 0, the bank will be 
indifferent between D =0 and D =0 if V (O,i5)-v (0, 0)=0. Using ( 14) and o 0 0 0 
( 17) we have: 
(fJ. -p-c) = O. D (AlO) 
This equation defines a vertical straight line, JJ' , in the space of 
intermediation margins. D will be 0 at points to the right of JJ' and 0 o 
at points to the left. 
( ii i )  Region below the horizontal axis and above GG' . As the optimal 
value of IX is 1 if D =D and o 
obtained by comparing V (I,D) o 
o if D =0, the optimal solution can be o 
with V (0,0) .  Indifference arises when o 
(fJ.A,IJ.D) verifies V o( l,i5)-V 0 (0,0)=0, L e . :  
(A11) 
Equation (A11) defines  a downward sloping curve, KK' , in the space of 
intermediation margins. D will be D at points to the right of KK' and 0 o 
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at points to the left. 
Notice that HH' and KK' intersect at iJ. =0, while GG' , J]' and KK' A 
intersect at iJ.D=p+c. Figure 2 can be straightforwardly derived from the 
results above. 0 
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APPENDIX 3: Comparative static resuLts. 
An equilibrium of type II is a pair (f.1. ,f.1. ) such that belongs to A(\B A 0 
( i . e. verifies (A9 ) )  and verifies ( 19) . 15 (A9) defines a downward sloping 
curve in the space of intermediation margins, whilst ( 19 )  corresponds to 
an upward sloping curve. The equilibrium corresponds to the intersection 
between both curves. The effects of the change in a parameter can be 
diagrammatically analyzed by looking at the movements of the curves and 
;the shift in their intersection. Implicit total differentiation of (A9) 
and (19) leads respectively to (A12) and (A13) ,  where the signs of the 
partial derivatives are written below the corresponding variables and 
parameters (absent parameters do not affect the corresponding 
equilibrium condition) .  
Gn (f.1.A , f.1.o; k, p, c, 0-) = 0, (A12) 
+ + + 
Hn(f.1.A, f.1.D; k, p,  c ,  K,  r ) B = o. (A13) 
+ 0 + + 
Similarly, an equilibrium of type III is defined by equations (All) 
and (20), which lead to (A14) and (A15) .  
Gm(f.1.A, f.1.o; k, p, c, 0-) = 0, (A14) 
+ + + 
Hm(f.1.A, f.1.o; k, p,  c ,  K, r ) B = o. (A15) 
+ 0 0 0 
15 I assume that inequality conditions such as D(f.1. )::15 hold with strict o 
inequality, otherwise the equilibrium could be treated as an eqUilibrium 
of type 1. 
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Finally, in an equilibrium of type IV, equilibrium conditions are 
(A8) and (21 ) ,  thus, 
Gr)IlA, IlD; k, p, c, 0') = 0, (A16) 
+ 0 0 + 
Hr)IlA, IlD; k, p, c ,  K, r ) B = O. (A17) 
0 + + + 0 
Obtaining the results of Tables 2, 3, and Al is qu.ite 
straightforward. Only the sign of dq/dk in type III equilibrium requires 
some additional computations in order to show that the direct effect 
dominates the ambiguous effect of Il even in the most unfavorable case. A 
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TABLE Al 
Comparative Statics 
Parameter Type of dll A dll D B q  d q  
( w )  equ i 1 ibrium dW dW -- dW 
k I + + 
II + + 
III ? + 
IV + + 
P I + + 0 
II + ? 0 ? 
III + + 0 
IV + + 0 
I 0 0 + + 
II + ++ 
III + ++ 
IV 0 + ++ 
r I 0 0 + 
B 
II + 0 ? 
III + 0 ? 
IV 0 0 0 0 
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CHAPTER 4 
CLOSURE RULES, MARKET POWER AND RISK -TAKING 
IN A DYNAMIC MODEL OF BANK BEHAVIOR 
1 .  INTRODUCTION. 
It is well known that informational asymmetries between creditors and 
shareholders together with limited liability lead to excessive 
risk-taking by indebted firms (Jensen and Mecklin, 1976) .  This problem 
can. be ameliorated by means of monitoring investment decisions, 
introducing special covenants in debt contracts and providing the 
adequate incentives in managerial contracts for managers to maximize the 
total value of the firm, instead of the value of equity. In the banking 
industry, however, small depositors have neither the incentive nor, 
probably, the ability to monitor and discipline bank management. 
Moreover, their reactions take the form of deposit withdrawals, which 
may lead to bank runs and eventual failures (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .  
Bank failures may cause substantial costs generating the so-called 
systemic risk of banking. 
Deposit insurance may therefore be considered as a way by which 
depositors delegate the role of monitoring and disciplining banks to the 
banking authorities (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993) .  This delegation 
eliminates free-riding and solves the coordination problem underlying 
bank runs. In turn, it creates a regulatory problem, since regulation 
(as opposed to the market) has to deal with the moral hazard problem 
usually faced by creditors in other industries. As first noted by Merton 
( 1977) ,  the deposit insurance agency is the writer of a put option on 
bank assets at a strike price equal to the promised maturity value of 
deposits. 
Static models of bank behavior under risk-insensitive deposit 
insurance show that higher mean-preserving portfolio risk and leverage 
are to the benefit of bank shareholders and to the detriment of the 
deposit insurance agency (see Furlong and Keeley, 1989).  In these 
models, if the value of assets at the end of the period is smaller than 
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the value of liabilities, bankruptcy is declared. Then, the deposit 
insurance agency closes the bank pays off depositors and, as receiver, 
liquidates the assets of the bank. The payoff corresponding to bankers 
is zero and that is all. In a dynamic setting, the banker who goes 
bankrupt is likely to suffer losses related to future payoffs. Apart 
from reputational losses which would appear in other industries, banking 
regulation contains special provisions for promoters and managers of 
banks which become insolvent, so that they are typically excluded from 
business. Bankers need a charter to run a bank and, when supervisors 
iptervene in bankruptcy procedures, the charter of the failed 
institution is either canceled after liquidation or transferred to a new 
holding company after a purchase and assumption transaction. As a 
consequence, the threat of loss of the value of the charter when the 
bank fails may act as a disciplinary device against risk-taking. 
Of course, for this to be the case, the value of the charter has to 
be positive. It is not rare, however, that locational, informational and 
reputational rents surge in the normal course of the banking business, 
where switching costs and regulatory barriers to entry are very 
plausible sources of market power. Thus, in a dynamic setting, the 
stream of potentially positive future expected profits determines the 
cost of bankruptcy to the banker. The higher the present value of such 
stream, the lower the incentive to adopt risky short run decisions. 
Present and future profits depend on market power as well as on the 
regulatory constraints and macroeconomic factors affecting banks� From a 
prudential perspective, a clear regulatory trade-off may exist: 
providing market power to the industry makes it safer, but investors' 
and depositors' surpluses may decline. Moreover, the regulator should 
know to which extent capital and asset regulations can compensate for 
the deterioration of soundness in an increasingly competitive banking 
sector. 
This paper examines the prudential regulation of banks taking into 
account the interactions between closure rules, market power and 
risk-taking that have been sketched above. Some authors have previously 
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analyzed the prudential implications of closure rules in banking, but 
. from different, more partial or less formal perspectives. Davis and 
McManus ( 1991) examine the behavior of a risk-averse bank manager who 
faces an exogenous bankruptcy cost in a standard one-period model, 
focusing on the regulatory choice of the range of net worth values at 
which the bank is closed. In a similar setup, Mailath and Mester ( 1993) 
analyze discretionary closure within a game theoretic model, dealing 
with the determination of the closure decision by the authority. Banking 
charters are specifically mentioned in Marcus ( 1984) and Keeley ( 1990) ,  
who relate their value to  market power. Their theoretical frameworks 
consist of simple one-period models where the charter is a shareholders' 
claim which is contingent on solvency and whose conditional-on-solvency 
value is essentially taken as given. 
Endogenizing the value of the charter within an infinite horizon 
model which allows for bankruptcy and closure constitutes the main 
purpose of this paper. The optimization program presented in section 2. 1 
extends in a natural way the typical decision problem faced by a bank in 
a static setting to a dynamic one. While in the static model the bank 
chooses an investment decision once and for all, in the dynamic model it 
chooses a state-contingent sequence of investment decisions. In the 
simplest stationary version of the model, time indices can be dropped 
and the state can be summarized by an indicator variable which 
represents whether the bank remains open or has been closed by the 
authorities. As in the standard bankruptcy procedures, the bank is 
closed if its net worth at the end of a period is negative. 
Dynamic programming techniques allow us to define the value 
function associated to the bank's problem and to obtain an implicit 
definition for the conditional-on-surviving equilibrium (net) value of 
the bank, v (section 2.2) .  Not surprisingly, v is the sum of current 
one-period profits and  the equilibrium value of the banking charter 
(which, in turn, is the discounted value of v times the probability of 
the bank being closed at the end of the current period) .  Equivalently, v 
is the expected (net) present value of the stream of current and future 
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one-period profits. 
Optimal policies depend on such equilibrium value of the bank. 
Under perfect competition, v is zero and the solution to the dynamic 
problem coincides with the one of the static problem: closure rules are 
ineffective in disciplining banks (section 2.3) .  With monopoly rents the 
dynamic problem is more interesting. And the easiest way to allow for 
rents is to assume that the bank is a ( local) monopolist in the market 
for deposits (section 2. 4) .  
With the elements previously introduced, section 3 discusses 
existence, uniqueness and comparative statics, deriving the effects on v 
of the capital requirement, the regulatory bound to the risk of bank 
assets, the degree of market power and the risk-free rate of interest. 
All these parameters may have a large influence on the value of the 
bank, which is the crucial determinant of bank risk-taking. 
Section 4 analyzes the behavior of the bank as a function of these 
parameters. Optimal bank policies are characterized and the regulatory 
trade-offs are discussed. In section 5, I extend the model in order to 
deal with an alternative closure rule which allows for voluntary 
recapitalization by shareholders in the event of failure. Section 6 
concludes with some policy implications for the current regulatory 
debate in the U.S.  and Europe. 
2. THE DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION PROGRAM. 
2.1. Banking charters, solvency and the dynamic program. 
In this paper, a bank is conceived as the investment project of a group 
of shareholders called bankers. Bankers are risk-neutral, enjoy limited 
liability and are initially granted a banking charter. A banking charter 
is an official permission to keep the bank open and under the control of 
their shareholders. The charter is renewed at the beginning of each 
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period provided that the bank is solvent. If this is not the case, the 
bank is intervened and banking authorities assume control. From the 
viewpoint of the bankers, intervention is equivalent to closure, since 
entails the loss of the charter. Therefore, in analyzing the behavior of 
a bank I will indistinctly refer to intervention or closure. 1 
The sequence of events in any period t in which the bank remains 
open is as follows. At the beginning of period t the bank raises 
deposits D and capital K in order to invest in a portfolio of assets. 
t t 
The gross return of the portfolio of assets is a random variable R(O" ) ,  
t 
independently distributed across time, with E[R(O" ) l=l+r and dispersion 
t 
measured by 0" .  r is the risk-free rate of interest. Shareholders'  
t 
decision entails choosing D , K and 0" • 
t t t 
At the end of period t, once asset returns are observed, the net 
worth of the bank, N , is computed as the difference between the 
t+l 
end-of -period-t value of assets and liabilities. The value of assets 
results from applying the stochastic gross return R(O" ) to the initial 
t 
investment D +K . Liabilities are made up of promised payments to 
t t 
depositors (principal plus interest) and non-interest intermediation 
costs -whose payment is assumed to take place at the end of the period-. 
Liabilities are fully insured by a deposit insurance agency, so that 
their cost is independent of the default risk of the bank. They are 
modeled as an increasing function of D ,  C(D ) .  Particular assumptions 
t t 
about the returns to scale in intermediation and the degree of market 
power posessed by the bank when taking deposits will determine the shape 
of this function. 2 Clearly, the net worth of the bank is a function of 
1 In practice, supervisors face a variety of alternative ways to resolve 
insolvencies and the one applied in each case depends upon 
considerations such as cost minimization and the preservation of 
confidence in the banking system (see Benston et al , 1986 ) .  
2 In particular, a linear technology together with perfect competition 
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the decision variables and the realization of R(cr ) :  
t 
N = R(cr ) (D +K ) - C(D ) .  
t+l t t t t 
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After computation of N , several possibilities arise. On the one 
t+l 
hand, the bank may be liquidated by the bankers or intervened by the 
authorities; in this case the final payoff to shareholders is 
max{N , a}. Alternatively, the bank may remain open and under the 
t+l 
control of the shareholders. Then they take decisions for the following 
period. In particular, by choosing K the shareholders implicitly 
t+l' 
decide whether the bank pays a dividend (K <N ) or raises more 
t+l t+l 
capital (K >N ) .  
t+l t+l 
The dynamic problem of the bank is different from a sequence of 
static problems because of the existence of a char.ter whose renewal 
takes place according to a closure rule. I will consider the simple and 
realistic case in which banking authorities deny renewal and close the 
bank if its net worth at the end of a period is negative. Let the 
indicator variable I represent whether the bank is open or closed at 
t  
the beginning of period t: 
if the bank is closed 
if the bank remains open. 
Then the dynamics of closure under this rule can be formalized as 
follows: 
I = I 
. 
g(N ), 
t t-l t 
in the market for deposits ( i .e. a rate-taking behavior by the bank) 
would cause C(D) to be linear. 




{ °1 g(X) 
if x< O 
otherwise. 
With this specification, I takes value ° in two different cases: first, 
t 
when the bank has been previously closed, I =0· second, when it 
t-l ' 
becomes insolvent at the end of period t-1, N <0. Otherwise, I takes 
t t 
value 1.  
In terms of the dynamic program, the state variable is I and the 
t 
vector of control variables is y =(D ,K ,CJ" ) . 
t t t t 
In each period, the bank 
is subject to static capital and asset regulations. On the one hand, a 
capital requirement obliges the bank to hold capital in excess of a 
certain fraction k of deposits, K �kD . On the other', regulatory limits 
t t 
to risk-taking in the asset side (together with the level of systematic 
risk in the economy) determine an upper bound to the level of risk of 
bank portfolios, CJ" s.a.. I assume that the informational and institutional 
t 
context is such that banking regulation cannot or does not directly 
depend on CJ" ,  although indirect constraints on portfolio composition, 
t 
off -balance-sheet operations, short-selling, sectorial and geographical 
concentration and the associated surveillance techniques allow the 
regulator to influence the upper bound to CJ" .  Accordingly, the set of 
t 
feasible controls of the dynamic program is specified as follows: 
r 
-
{y =(D ,K ,CJ" )e1R3 
t t t t + K �kD and CJ" s.iT}, t t t 
where k and CJ" are determined by the regulator. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will consider time-invariant k and CJ" so that the 
regulatory framework is stationary. 
The dynamic optimization problem solved by the bankers is: 






( l+rft t/JO , y  ) ] 
t t 
y e  r 
t 
t= 0, 1, 2, 
I = I . g(N ) t t-1 t 
I =1 o 
t= 1, 2, 
where the state-dependent one-period profit function is given by: 
( 1+r) max{N , O} - K { -1 
� 0 
t� t 
if I = 1  t 




The bankers'  problem can be interpreted as finding an optimal sequence 
of financial and investment decisions {D , K  ,O' }. in an infinite 
t t t 
discrete-time horizon. Risk-neutral bankers maximize the expected 
discounted value of the stream of cash-flows from their investment in 
the bank. If the bank is open, the investment generates an outflow of K 
t 
at the beginning of period t and an inflow of max{N , O} at the end 
t+1 
(discounting applies) .  If the bank is closed, cash-flows are zero. 
The main difference between this program and the static one is 
that, while in the latter the bank ignores the closure rule, in the 
former the bank takes into account the impact of its present decisions 
on the probability of being closed, since closure hinders its 
shareholders from obtaining potentially positive future profits. 3 When 
such profits are high, a clear incentive to adopt prudent short-run 
policies arises. 
3 Provided that 




the static program is: 
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2.2. The value function. 
Dynamic programming techniques allow us to define the value function 






-1 E[I/J(I , y  )+( 1+r) Vo ) ] .  t t t+l (3)  
This functional equation has a simple structure, since I takes only two 
t 




0 if 1 =0 
VO ) t t if I = 1  v 
t 
( 4 )  
where v is  the conditional-on-survival equilibrium value of the bank, 
which henceforth I will simply call the equilibrium value of the bank: 
v = sup 
y er 
t 
E[I/JO ,y ) + ( 1+rf1V(I ) 1 I =11 .  
t t t+1 t 
(5) 
Observe that the stationarity of the problem implies that v does not 
depend on time. 
Now, using expression (4)  evaluated in period t+l and the 
definition of 
It+1, 
written as follows: 
the conditional expected value of 
E[V(I ) 1 I =1] = Prob[I =1 1 I =1] · v 
t+l t t+l t 
Vo ) t+l can be 
Since the probability of remaining open in t+l when the bank is open in 
t only depends on being solvent at the end of period t, we have 
E[VO ) 1 I =11 = Prob[N �O] · v. 
t+l t t+l 
(6 )  
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Plugging (6)  into (5) and denoting Prob[N �O] by 4l(y ) ,  we get: 
t+1 t 
v = sup 
y er 
t 
{ E[t/JO,y ) ]  + ( l+rfl41(y )v } ,  
t t 
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This equation is fully time and state independent, so we can drop the 
time indices and leave: 
v = sup { IT(y) + ( l+rfl41(y)v }, 
yer 
(7) 
where IT(y) denotes the conditional-on-survival expected one-period 
profit of the bank, E[t/J(1 ,y) ] .  
The set of optimal policies for a given v can be defined as 
follows: 
Y(v) -1 = argmax { IT(y) + (1+r) 4l(y)v }. (8 )  
ye r 
When the bank decides an optimal control at the outset of period t, v is 
taken as given, since y does not affect the expected future value of the 
bank, but only the probability of it to remain open; 4l(y) .  The higher 
the value of v, the lower the incentives to adopt short-run decisions 
that could increase the likelihood of being closed. 
2.3. One-period profits and the probability of being closed. 
Notice that, if C(D) were linear and shareholders were able to raise as 
much capital as they wanted at an  opportunity cost r, the bank's 
one-period profit function, IT(y),  would be homogeneous of degree 1 in D 
and K, whilst the capital requirement inequality and the probability of 
survival 4l(y) would be homogeneous of degree 0: 
IT(y) = (1+rf1E[max{R(O'HD+K)-C(D) ,  O}] - K, 
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q,(y) = Prob[R(o-) (D+K)-C(D) � 0] .  
In  such a situation, the value function would also be homogeneous of 
degree 1 in D and K. Degree-one homogeneity implies that  my) is 
zero and, hence, v is zero for the optimal values of D and K (and, 
accordingly, the optimal scale of the bank is indeterminate)  the 
optimization problem lacks strictly positive and bounded solution for D 
and K. 
Assume, for example, that C(D)=(l+r +c)D, where r stands for the D D 
interest rate paid on deposits and c the non-interest intermediation 
costs per unit of deposits. It is well-known that the equilibrium 
outcome in a perfectly competitive industry faCing constant returns to 
scale entails that prices are such that a zero-profit condition holds. 
Similarly, perfect competition between banks like -the one described 
above would necessarily lead to an equilibrium deposit interest rate r D 
such that my) and v would be equal to zero. If v equals zero, however, 
the optimal control simply maximizes one-period expected profits (see 
equation (8 ) ) ,  thus ignoring the impact of its decisions on the 
probability of remaining open. With this equilibrium argument, we can 
state the following result. 
PROPOSITION 1: Under constant returns to scale in intermediation and 
perfect competition, closure rules do not affect bank decisions. 
Previous literature has shown that the behavior of insured banks in 
static perfectly competitive frameworks is characterized by maximum 
leverage and volatility of the returns on assets (Furlong and Keeley, 
1989) -which reach the bounds imposed by capital and asset regulations- .  
Moreover, implicit subsidies of  the deposit insurance scheme pass 
through to prices, affecting the equilibrium returns on bank assets and 
liabilities (Gennotte, 1990) and the efficiency of investment decisions 
(Gennotte and Pyle, 1991; Suarez, 1993b) .  Proposition 1 means that 
closure rules as specified above are ineffective in lessening these 
problems. Besides, dynamic considerations are not relevant to solving 
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the optimization problem of the bank and, hence in such a context static 
models are valid to describe the impact of banking regulation. 
In particular, the static model in Suarez ( 1993a) shows that under 
perfect competition the optimal profit maximizing policy involves K/D=k, 
(J':{i and a perfectly elastic supply of deposits at a rate r* (determined 
D 
by a zero profit condition) which depends on r, c, k and 0:. 
Nevertheless, perfect competition may not be a reasonable 
9-ypothesis. Locational, informational and reputational rents may arise 
in the normal course of the banking business; switching costs and 
regulatory barriers to entry are possible sources of market power. For 
many years, direct controls on interest rates and commissions and 
regulatory restrictions on branching and geographical expansion imposed 
clear limits to competition. In fact, the structure of the banking 
sector in many countries is far from the idealized atomistic market 
structure where price-taking arises as a natural assumption. 
Standard models of oligopolistic competition have long been applied 
to analyzing the banking industry (see Gilbert, 1984) .  More recently, 
several authors have successfully developed specific models of banking 
and financial intermediation inspired in modern industrial organization 
analysis (Matutes and Vives, 1992; Repulio, 1991) .  
The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of closure rules on 
bank behavior. Up to now we know that such effect is null if there is 
nothing to lose in the event of closure. An easy way to obtain positive 
rents in this model without dealing with complex strategic interactions 
between different banks is to assume that the bank exercises monopoly 
power in the market for deposits. 4 So, I will analyze the case of a 
4 Alternatively, positive rents might be obtained by assuming decreasing 
returns to scale in the intermediation technology, but this assumption 
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monopolistic bank in a simplified context where non -interest 
. intermediation costs are zero. 
2.4. Modeling market power. 
Suppose that the bank has a local monopoly in the supply of deposits. 
Bank deposits provide transaction and liquidity services to depositors, 
who are consequently willing to demand deposits even if their rate of 
return r is smaller than the risk-free rate r. Clearly, when r equals D D 
r, depositors hold all of their financial wealth as deposits. When r is D 
smaller than r, the opportunity cost of holding deposits is positive, 
but the utility of liquidity services may compensate for it. Define the 
intermediation margin p. as the difference between r and r .  D If the 
marginal utility of liquidity services is decreasing in the amount of 
deposits, the demand for deposits will be a decreasing function of p.. 
For notational convenience, the (exogenously given) financial 
wealth of potential depositors can be normalized to unity. Then, in 
terms of the inverse demand function for deposits, the behavior of 
depositors can be parameterized as follows: 
( l+r ) = ( 1+r) D1) D (9)  
so that, taking logs, p.O<-1)log(D) .  Notice that p. decreases as D 
would be counter-factual. In a recent paper, McAllister and McManus 
( 1993) argue that U-shaped cost functions traditionally estimated in 
banking (see Gilbert, 1984) were due to econometric problems. Once these 
problems are solved, there is strong evidence of increasing returns to 
scale for small banks and approximately constant returns for larger 
banks. On the other hand, considering the exercise of monopoly power in 
the market for loans would require a careful treatment of the implicit 
variety of risk levels associated to the choice of IT. 
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increases, and is strictly positive for D<l and zero for D=l. 11 is the 
semi-elasticity of ,.,. to changes in D. The greater 11, the greater the 
degree of market power of the monopolist bank. Equation (9)  yields the 
following simple specification for C(D) :  
11+1 C(D) = ( l+r) D . 
In order to obtain a convenient closed-form for TT(y)=E[I/J(1,y ) ] ,  the 
following parameterization of R(CT) is assumed: 
2 R(CT) = (1+r)exp(CTz-CT /2) ,  ( 10)  
where z is a gaussian white noise process. According to ( 10 ) ,  R(CT)  is a 
log-normally distributed random variable with expected value equal to 
( l+r) and standard deviation increasing with CT. Let F(z) denote the 
cumulative distribution function of z and f(z)  the corresponding density 
function. 
Now, putting all of their components together, we have 
2 11+1 I/J(l,y) = max{exp(CTZ-CT /2) (D+K)-D , O} - K, 
2 11+1 �(y) = Prob[exp(CTz-CT /2) (D+K)-D 2:0] 
(notice that the discount factor cancels out with the ( 1+r) terms in 
R(CT) and C(D) ) .  Since exp(CTz-CT2/2HD+K)-D11+12:0 if and only if 
Z 2: ( l/CT) [ (11+1)log(D)-log(D+K)+CT72] w, 
we can write 
+ 00  2 11+1 } ( ) E[ljJ(l ,y ) ]  = J max{exp(CTz-O' /Z) (D+K)-D , 0  f Z dz - K - 00  
00 2 11+1 = J [exp(CTz-CT /2) (D+K)-D ]f(z)dz - K. 
w 
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Now, from the normality of z, E[IjI(1,y) ] can be written in terms of 
the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable. 
Integrating by parts and rearranging, 
TT(y) = E[IjI(I ,y) ]  = F(x) (D+K) - F(X-CT)D1)+l - K, (11 )  
where 
(12)  
On the other hand, 
�(y) = Prob[z�w] = F(X-CT).  ( 13 )  
The first two terms in (11 )  represent, respectively, the value of assets 
and liabilities to the bankers. The first one is the product of the 
probability of the bank being able to pay off depositors at the end of 
the period, F(X-CT), times the conditional on solvency present expected 
value of assets, [F(x}/F(x-CT)] (D+K) . 5 The second is the expected present 
value of payments to depositors, F(X-CT)D1)+l. Expression (1) is akin to 
the Black-Scholes formula for the valuation of call options and has,  as 
the latter, the interesting property of its partial derivative with 
respect to x being equal to zero. 6 
5 The conditional on solvency present expected value of assets is the 
mean of a truncated log-normal variable (only non-bankruptcy values of z 
2 are relevant) and, hence, results from integrating exp(CTz-CT 12) over 
[w,oo) with respect to [ 1-F(w) r1f(z)dz=[F(x-CT) r1f(z)dz. 
6 In order to 
exp(CT2/2-CTX)f(X) ,  
derive this result, notice that 8F(x-CT)18x=f(x-o-)= 
write 8TT(y}/8x=f(x) [ (D+K)-exp(CT2/2-CTX)D1)+1] ,  and use 
the definition of x in order to show that the term in square brackets is 
zero. 
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3. THE STEADY-STATE VALUE OF THE BANK. 
In this section I use expressions ( 11 )  and (3) to show that the 
steady-state equilibrium value of the bank is well-defined in the sense 
that there exists a unique v that solves equation (7) .  Later on, 
comparative static results on this v will be derived. 
3.1.. Existence and uniqueness of v. 
Let H(v) be the auxiliary function defined by the right hand side . of 
equation (7) :  
-1 H(v) = sup { IT(y) + ( 1+r) �(y)v }.  ( 14 )  
yer 
One technical lemma referring to the properties of the function H(v) 
leads almost directly to Proposition 2, that states the desired result. 
The proof of the Lemma is given in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 1: For all v�O, H(v) is a continuous, increasing and positive 
function. Furthermore, its slope is smaller than 1 .  
PROPOSITION 2: There exists an unique v*�O such that H(v*)=v*. 
Proof: We are looking for a single fixed point in H( . ) 
(diagrammatically, a single intersection between the graph of H(v) and 
the 4S-degree line) .  Let mv) be the function defined by the following 
expression: 
-1 = sup IT(y) + ( 1+r) v. 
yer 
( 15 )  
mv) is  linear in v since supII(y) does not depend on v .  supIT(y) is 
finite because II(y) is a continuous function, D and (J' are bounded, II(y) 
is decreasing in K and K has a lower bound in zero. Moreover, the slope 
of H(v )  is smaller than one, because the discount factor is smaller than 
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one. Therefore, H(v) cuts the 4S-degree line at a single finite value of 
v, v=[ ( 1+r )/r] [supIT(y) ] .  Hence, using Lemma 1 and the fact that 
H(v)�H(v) ,  we conclude that H(v) also cuts the 4S-degree line. 7 
Furthermore, the intersection takes place at single point v*, to the 
left of v (see Figure 1 ) . CJ 
Notice that v* is strictly positive when supIT(y) is strictly 
positive ( L e. when the bank has market power) and zero when supIT(y) is 
zero ( L e. under perfect competition) .  
3.2. Comparative statics. 
Given the properties of mv) and the uniqueness of v*, comparative 
static results can be obtained by examining how changes in the 
regulatory and structural parameters move the grar;>h of H(v) in the 
neighborhood of V*. Upward shifts increase the steady state value of the 
bank, whereas downward shifts reduce it. Comparative statics on v* are 
interesting for two reasons. First, they provide insights into the 
fundamentals that determine the value of a chartered regulated bank. 
Some models of bank behavior include exogenous charter values, but the 
value of a charter is intrinsically endogenous. Second, the optimal 
policy of the bank depends critically upon v (see equation (8 ) )  and 
comparative statics will allow us to analyze in section 4 the impact of 
structural and regulatory parameters on bank risk-taking. 
In order to study the movements of H(v),  we should take into 
account the underlying optimization process. If we denote by y(v) a 
policy which is optimal for a given v and define the function G(y,v )  as 
IT(y)+(1+rfl4?(y)v, the function H(v) can be written as G(y(v) ,v) .  The 
7 The auxiliary function mv) allow us to discard the possibility of 
H( v) approaching asymptotically to the 4S-degree line but never 
intersecting it despite of having a slope smaller than one. 
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change in a parameter may generally affect both the function G(y, v) and 
its first argument y(v) .  Comparative statics is, however, notably 
simplified by the fact that y(v) is chosen so as to maximize G(y, v) on 
the feasible set r. 
Table 1 contains the comparative statics for changes in the capital 
requirement k, the regulatory limit on the level of risk cr, the 
risk-free rate r and the degree of market power 11. 
TABLE 1 
Regulatory and structural determinants 













k is bindingt 
0: is bindingt 
none 
none 
Parameters k and cr do not affect G(y,v) directly, but the feasible 
set r and perhaps y(v) .  Only when the constraints that they define are 
binding at y(v ) ,  a small change in k or 0:, can change y(v) and then 
H(v) .  When the capital requirement is binding, higher ( lower) k reduces 
(widens) r and causes H(v) and, then, v* to be smaller (greater) .  When 
it is not, small variations in k are innocuous. 
Similarly, if the upper bound to portfolio risk is binding, greater 
cr can make H(v) and v* to rise, whilst smaller c;: will have the opposite 
effect. 
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Parameters r and 1'/ affect directly G(y,v) but not r. Thus, small 
changes in them cannot change the components of y(v) which represent a 
corner solution. On the other hand, the envelope theorem ensures that 
the interior components of y(v) may vary, but their variation will only 
have (negligible) second order effects on G(y,v) .  Therefore, only the 
direct effects of r and 1'/ on G(y, v) are relevant. These effects can be 
computed as the corresponding partial derivatives of G(y, v) at y(v) .  
From equations (11 )  and (13 ) :  
-2 8G(y,vl/8r = - ( l+r ) �(y)v < 0, 
8G(y,vl/81'/ = - [F(X-O")D1'/+l + (1I0")(1+rf1f(x-0")v]log(D) > 0. 
Notice that log(D )<O, since O�D�1. 
On the one hand, increases in r cause the present value of future 
expected profits to fall and, hence, reduce H(v) and the value of the 
bank. On the other hand, when the degree of market power increases, 
potentially wider intermediation margins and higher expected profits 
account for a greater value of H(v) and v*. 
These results support the intuitive idea that regulatory reforms 
that reduce the operative capacity of the bank cannot do bankers good 
and are consistent with the usual reluctance of the banking industry to 
accept harder regulatory constraints, except when they enhance directly 
or indirectly the degree of market power and the rents of the existing 
institutions. Note, however, that such reluctance would not make sense 
in a perfectly competitive environment, where the equilibrium value of a 
bank would be zero anyway. 
4. THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON BANK RISK-TAKING. 
This section is devoted to analyze the impact of structural and 
regulatory parameters on bank risk-taking. First, I will characterize 
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the behavior of the bank for all possible values of v. Because of 
non-convexities introduced by limited liability, the bank will follow 
one of two distinct types of policy: a safe policy (where 0'=0 and the 
optimal capital structure is indeterminate) or a risky policy (where 0'=0' 
and the capital requirement is binding) ,  the type that dominates 
depending on v. Later on, I will focus on the equilibrium policies -i . e. 
the policies which correspond to the equilibrium value of the bank v*­, 
in order to determine the impact of the structural and regulatory 
par.ameters of the model on the equilibrium type of policy and the 
solvency of the bank. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the 
model for the design of banking regulation. 
4.1.  Characterizing bank behavior: safe and risky policies. 
The set of optimal policies for a given value of v is defined as 
follows: 
Y(v) = argmax { IT(y) + ( 1+rf1cp(y)v } .  
ye r 
The optimization problem underlying this definition has corner solutions 
for 0'. This means that the solutions found in static models under 
perfect competition also appear in this dynamic monopolistic framework. 
The difference, however, is that in this context the riskiest policy is 
not necessarily the best one. Briefly, according to the value of v, the 
bank decides to be safe or to be risky. 
LEMMA 2: There is no interior solution for 0'. Depending on parameters, 
O'(v) may be either 0 or 0:. Moreover, a policy involving O'=a' can only be 
optimal if the capital requirement is binding, K=kD. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Lemma 2 implies that policies with 0<0'<0:- whatever k, or with O'=a' and 
K>kD will never be optimal. Intuitively, the bank decides either to be 
safe in order to preserve its future rents or to exploit the deposit 
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insurance system by means of the highest feasible volatility and 
leverage. Accordingly, we can condition the analysis of optimal policies 
upon the choice of (J', characterizing first the best policies for (J'=O, 
Y (v)  (the best safe policies) ,  and then the best policies for cr-=<T and s 
K=kD, Y (v) (the best risky policies ) .  Clearly, the unconditional 
R 
optimal policies are the best of Y (v) and Y (v) .  
S R 
The best safe policies. Under the safe choice of (J' the bank cannot fail, 
the capital structure is irrelevant and being or not closed becomes a 
,deterministic outcome. The profit function takes a very simple 
expression: 
TI(y) = TI(D,K,O) = 0 - 011+1. ( 16 )  
The conditional optimal supply of  deposits is  defined . by the first order 
condition derived from (16 ) ,  which leads to D =(11(1+1)) )
111). This S 
expression is always smaller than 1 when 1) is strictly higher than zero. 
As neither TI(D,K,O)  nor �(D,K,O)=l depend on K, the bank will choose any 
K==kD . Notice that the best safe policies are independent of v. Finally, s 
let 
H (v) s = max{IT(D,K,O)+(1+r f
l�(D,K,O)v} = 1
1) D + ( 1+rf1v.  S y er  
The best risky pol iCies, Under cr-=(j" and K=kD, the probability of being 
closed at the end of a period is positive for all D>O. The conditional 
optimal supply of deposits 0 (v) can be defined -after substituting kD 
R 




= argmax {(1+k)F(x)D-F(x-cr)D1)+1_kD+(1+rf1F(x-cr)v}, 
O=:D=:l  
- -2 X = ( l/(J') [log(l+k)-1)logD+(J' 121 .  
( 17 )  
( 18)  
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An unique interior solution to this problem does not necessarily exist . 
. For one thing, the usual first order condition may yield a value of D 
which is greater than one. For another, even if it yields a single 
O<D<l, the second order condition does not necessarily hold, so that we 
can have a minimum, a maximum or a saddle point. Non-convexities might 
lead in principle to corner solutions such as D=O and D=1. 
Even though computing D (v) 
R 
will require, in general, numerical 
calculation, the following lemma states that for values of v such that 
the best risky policies are better than the safe policies, 
greater that D . 5 
LEMMA 3: For any v�O such that O'(v)=<r, D (v» D . 
R S 




Intuitively, if appropriating the subsidy to risk-taking which is 
associated to the deposit insurance system makes sense, the bank is 
willing to pay higher deposit rates than under the best safe policy, 
since the increase in the subsidy due to greater D pays for the fall in 
intermediation margins, the subsequent loss of monopoly rents and the 
increase in the probability of being closed. 
Finally, notice that Y (v) ,  in contrast to Y (v) ,  may depend on v, and R S 
let 
H (v) = 
R 
max {TI(D,kD,iT)+(1 +r fl4,i(D,kD,iT)v}. 
O :$ D:$l 
The unconditional optimal policies. Now, by comparing H (v)  with H (v)  S R 
we can obtain the unconditional optimal policy for each v. From previous 
results, the function H(v) defined in expression (14) is equal to 
max{H (v) ,H (v)). Proposition 3 shows that the optimal policy depends S R 
crucially but in a simple and intuitive way on v. 
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PROPOSITION 3: There exists a unique v�O such that the optimal policy is 
the safe policy for all v�v and the risky policy for all v:sv. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Figure 2 represents functions H (v)  and H (v) .  As shown in the picture, S R 
the ordinate at the origin is higher for H (v)  than for H (v) ,  but the 
S R 
slope of H (v)  is greater than that of H (v) given the positive 
S R 
probability of being closed (and losing the charter value) under the 
risky policy. As proved in Proposition 3, they intersect in a single 
point V, that separates the values of v at which each policy dominates. 
4.2. Regulatory and structural determinants of bank risk-taking. 
From Proposition 3 we can deduct that H(v) is a continuous function with 
a kink in V. Whether the equilibrium policy of the bank is safe or risky 
depends upon the relative position of v with respect to the fixed point 
of H(v),  V*. Accordingly, I will consider three possible cases: v*>v, 
v*<v and v*=v. 
(i) v*>v.  When the equilibrium value of the bank is relatively 
high, the bank chooses a safe policy, y(v*)eY (v* ) .  Capital and asset S 
regulations are not binding and the probability of failing the solvency 
test is zero. As the bank is safe, small changes in the parameters are 
innocuous from a prudential point of view: the probability of failure is 
zero. The parameters k and iT do not affect the equilibrium value of the 
bank. On the contrary, r and T/ have the effects shown in Table 1 .  
low, 
( i i )  v*<v. When the equilibrium value of the bank is relatively 
the bank chooses a risky policy, y(v*)eY (v* ) .  Both capital and 
R 
asset regulations are binding and the probability of failing the 
solvency test is strictly positive. The solvency of the bank, measured 
by F(x-O') ,  depends directly on the parameters k, 0: and T/ and on the 
optimal supply of deposits. This, in turn, is affected by the parameters 
and by the equilibrium value of the bank, and is higher than with the 
safe policy. Finally, all the parameters k, 0:, r and T/ have non-null 
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effects on the equilibrium value of the bank, as shown in Table 1 (see 
section 3. 2 ) .  So the comparative statics on the solvency of the bank 
involves three terms: 
(19) 
- 8 . for w=k,0',r ,1I .  It IS worth noting that the last two terms of this 
equation are neglected in static models with perfectly competitive banks 
(constant returns to scale and perfect competition would leave D 
R 
indeterminate, whilst the introduction of v only makes sense in a 
dynamic model) .  
From equation (18) ,  we deduce that the direct effect (the first term in 
( 19) )  is positive for k and 11 (recall that D ::1 ) ,  negative for 0:, and 
R 
null for r. If the supply of deposits does not vary, higher 
capitalization, a smaller upper bound on portfolio risk and increased 
market power enhance the solvency of the bank. 
The effects coming from the shift in the supply of deposits depend on 
the sensitiveness of D (v* )  to v* and the parameters. If the equilibrium 
R 
supply of deposits is unique and equals one, aD law equals zero and R 
these effects disappear. When the equilibrium supply of deposits is 
smaller than one, the signs of aD law and aD lav are ambiguous. Some 
R R 
numerical examples show that the supply-of -deposits effects are 
generally small compared to the direct effects. 
( iii) v*=v. When the equilibrium value of the bank equals the 
critical value V, the bank is indifferent between the risky policies in 
Y (v*) and the safe policies in Y (v* ) .  The situation under each of this 
R S 
8 Equation (19) holds for cases in which D (v*) R 
differentiating D (v* )  makes no sense. 
R 
is unique; otherwise, 
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policies has been described in OJ and (ii ) .  In this case, however, 
changes in k, (1", r and 1/ may lead the bank to shift from safe to risky 
or viceversa. 
For k and (1", the result is immediate. Tighter regulation makes the bank 
to prefer a safe policy, since regulatory burdens reduce the value of 
the bank only when risky (remember Table 1 ) .  Diagrammatically, higher k 
and lower 0: move downward the curve H (v) ,  but do not alter H (v) .  Thus, 
R S 
V moves to the left, while v* remains constant. Figure 3 illustrates 
�his result. 
Variations in r and 1/ change the position of both H (v) and H (v) and 
R S 
diagrammatic analysis is not enough to clarify whether the risky or the 
safe policies dominate after the change. However, the results are 
unambiguous. Proposition 4 shows that an increase in the interest rate 
introduces an advantage for risky policies, since their profitability 
rests comparatively more on one-period profits and less on future 
discounted profits. 
PROPOSITION 4: When v*=v, small increases (decreases) in r will lead the 
bank to choose the risky (safe) policies. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
On the other hand, the equilibrium value of a bank is the expected 
discounted value of current and future one-period profits. Greater 
market power (1/) enhances the current and future profits of the bank 
under both the risky and the safe policies. Nevertheless, the benefit of 
greater 1/ is higher the lower the supply of deposits (as an extreme 
case, when D equals one the benefit is zero) .  Accordingly, an increase 
in market power makes the safe policy better since, from Lemma 3, D is s 
smaller than D (v*) .  
R 
PROPOSITION 5: When v*=v, small increases (decreases) in 1/ will lead the 
bank to choose the safe (risky) policies. 
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
The results obtained in this section provide a clear understanding 
of how regulatory and structural parameters influence the safety of 
banks. A bank can suddenly switch from the safe policies to the risky 
policies as a result of sudden or accumulated changes in the economic 
environment where it operates. Small changes in the stringency of 
capital and asset regulations, in the macroeconomic conditions as 
reflected in the interest rate or the level of systematic risk (which is 
likely to affect 0: for a given asset regulation) ,  or in the degree of 
market power of incumbent banks can increase, for instance, the latent 
advantages of risky policies versus safe policies. If the changes 
continue over time, a point can be reach where the bank jumps from the 
latter to the former. whilst in the meantime the potential deterioration 
of solvency remains hidden. 9 Some authors have argued that the market 
value of equity could be used to monitor the safety of banks and pricing 
deposit guarantees. IO With the previous results, however, situations can 
be identified in which the jump to risky policies may coincide with 
increases in the value of the bank, contributing to confuse the 
regulator. Assume, for example. that (1' increases so as to make the risky 
policy better. The rise in 0: does not change the value of the safe 
policy. but increases the value of the risky policy. Then, the shift to 
the risky policy entails an increase in equity value (higher v*) !  
The results concerning the case v*=v can be  used to  analyze the 
9 These arguments are strictly valid within the stationary version of 
the model that has been presented in this paper if subsequent changes in 
the parameters are fully unanticipated and taken to be permanent. 
10 Marcus and Shaked ( 1984) ,  and Ronn and Verma ( 1986) ,  among others, 
have used option valuation formlas and equity values to infer the 
(underlying) value of bank assets. 
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effects of regulatory reforms when regulation applies uniformly to a set 
of heterogeneous banks, say the banks in a national banking industry. 
Assume that banks only differ in their degree of ( local) monopoly power 
and, then, il is distributed across banks in a certain fashion. For a 
given set of parameters k, a: and r, the case v*=v will correspond to a 
particular 1)=1). According to previous results, banks with il<1) will 
prefer a risky policy, whereas banks with  will prefer a safe policy. 
Higher k, lower a: and lower r imply a lower li, reduce the set of banks 
which choose to be risky and, hence, the risk of banking industry as a 
whole. The effects are the opposite if capital and asset regulations are 
lessened and the interest rate goes up. 
4.3. Regulatory trade-offs. 
Banking regulation is 
objectives: investor 
traditionally intended to pursue two 
protection and financial stability. 
different 
Investor 
protection, on the one hand, is justified in a context of asymmetric 
information where depositors have neither the incentives nor probably 
the capability to evaluate and monitor the quality and behavior of 
banks. Avoiding the perverse incentives and distortions created by 
adverse selection and moral hazard is a rationale for the delegation of 
such functions in a regulator which, correspondingly, insures bank 
deposits. On the other hand, preserving financial stability relates to 
the threat of bank runs and, more generally, to the external costs of 
bank failures that include the breakdown of long-run relationships 
between banks and investors (and the associated loss of information) ,  
the risk of contagion and the disturbance of the payment system. 
Providing full deposit insurance to depositors as in the model 
presented in this paper solves some of the problems noted above, but 
raises others. By transferring the risks of loss from depositors to the 
deposit insurance agency, it eliminates market discipline. Banking 
regulation now has to provide such a discipline. The design of banking 
regulation should take into account the following issues: ( i )  the role 
of banks in funding risky investment projects with potentially positive 
Closure Rules, Market Power and Risk-Taking 133 
net present value, Oi) the role of banks in providing liquidity and 
transaction services through deposits, ( iii ) the cost of public funds 
eventually used to cover the deficits of the deposit insurance system, 
( iv) the residual externalities associated with the failure of 
fully-insured banks. 
In the model presented in this paper, the rate of return on risky 
assets has been taken as given and, for the sake of simplicity, I have 
ass1,.lmed that the expected return on risky assets equals the risk-free 
rate, so that investing in risky assets gives no special advantages from 
a social point of view. Then issue ( i )  can be neglected. On the 
contrary, issues ( iii) and (iv) provide good reasons for promoting a 
safe policy, while issue Oi) discourages regulations which increase the 
monopoly power of banks in the detriment of depositors' surplus. 
Thereby, in this context, an adequate regulation could rest on asset 
regulations that restrain banks from investing in risky assets and, as a 
limit case, reduce � to zero. 
The first issue is, however, crucial and its omission can lead to 
erroneous policy recommeridations. Fortunately, it can be addressed by 
informal relaxation of the assumption mentioned above. Note that in a 
general equilibrium framework the return on risky assets would be 
endogenous and would depend on the interaction of supply and demand. 
More concretely, we can think of a setup where projects of a certain 
class of risk exhibit different expected rates of return and banks of 
the type described in the model bid for them in a competitive fashion. 
In equilibrium a critical expected return would be obtained such that 
projects above it would be funded whilst projects below it would not. 
With several risk levels, the shape of the equilibrium expected 
return-risk schedule would probably depend upon the preference of banks 
for risk. If for a given uniform rate of return the banks preferred safe 
policies, equilibrium market clearing would possibly lead the return on 
safer assets to be lower and the return on riskier assets to be higher; 
in such case, the slope of the return-risk schedule would be positive, 
positive risk-premia would be paid on risky assets and under-investment 
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in risky projects (from the perspective of a risk-neutral planner) would 
result. To the contrary, if banks preferred a risky policy when the 
expected rates of return were the same, the slope would be negative, 
implying negative risk-premia and over-investment in risky assets. 
In such a framework, the allocative consequences of banking 
regulation are likely to be very important and the regulator should 
weight issue ( i )  against the others. In particular, although reducing cr 
induces safer behavior and lessens the probability of bankruptcy, cr 
,curtails the set of projects to be funded, no matter what their expected 
return be. Nevertheless, market power and the associated rents can 
incite chartered banks to be safer and increase the Ci which is necessary 
to induce safe policies. A clear regulatory trade-off may emerge. 
Banking regulation by means of the chartering policy and the 
requirements for the creation of new banks or branc:hes, among others, 
can create barriers to entry which protect and enhance the exercise of 
monopoly power. In my model, a higher -q is an alternative to capital and 
asset regulations when the regulator tries to promote solvency, although 
it obviously lessens depositors welfare by decreasing the interest rate 
paid on deposits. Some authors had previously referred to this trade-off 
as one between efficiency and solvency. Further research could centre on 
this issue from an optimal regulation perspective a �a Laffont-Tirole. ll 
5.  THE OPTION TO RECAPITALIZE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLOSURE. 
Throughout this paper, I have considered the simple (but realistic) 
closure rule under which banking authorities deny renewal of the charter 
and close the bank if its net worth at the end of a period is negative. 
The threat of being closed in such a context has been proved to be an 
11 See Laffont and Tirole ( 1993) and, for an application to banking, 
Bensaid et aL ( 1993) .  
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effective way to induce the bank to be prudent when the present value of 
its future rents is sufficiently high. In this section, I show that this 
disciplinary effect of closure vanishes when an apparently minor change 
in the closure rule is introduced to allow for recapitalization by 
shareholders when the net worth of the bank at the end of a period is 
negative but they wish the bank to remain open. 
Assume that banking authorities, instead of directly closing the 
bank when its net worth at the end of a period is negative, allow 
shareholders to inject new funds into the bank so as to afford promised 
payments to depositors and obtain the renewal of the charter. 
Authorities may find attractive the avoidance of closure and liquidation 
when recapitalization takes place. 
Under this rule, shareholders have an option to .retain the charter. 
The exercise price of such option is the additional capital ( if any) 
that has to be raised in order to fully pay off depositors. In terms of 
the dynamic optimization program, the state variable, I ,  becomes also a 
t 
control variable, whilst previous period net worth, N ,  becomes a state 
t 
variable. I is chosen at the begining of each period, once N is 
t t 
observed. Choosing I =1 requires I =1 (otherwise the bank would be 
t t-l 
closed) and entails keeping the charter and recapitalizing, i. e. 
injecting -N if N <0, and 0 otherwise. On the contrary, choosing 1 =0 
t t t 
implies refusing the option. 
The dynamic optimization problem of the bank is: 
Maximize 
{ I t ' Yt }7=o 
subject to 
E [  E ( 1+rft[min{N ,O} · I  +1/10 ,y )} ] 
t t t t t = O  
I e{O, l } t 
I �I t t -l 
y e f  
t 
N =0 o 
} 
t= 0, I, 2, . . .  
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where the constraint l ::sl states that if shareholders refuse the t t-1 
option on the charter at any period, the charter is lost forever. The 
definitions of r and 1{1(I ,y ) are those given by equations ( l l  and (2)  
t t 
in section 2. 1 .  Recall that l{1(It'Yt ) depends on It but not on Nt' 
Keeping the same notation as above, and with S =(1 ,N ) as the t t-1 t 
vector of state variables, dynamic programming techniques allow us to 
define the following value function: 
-1 V(S )= sup {min{N ,O} ' I  + sup E[I{1( I ,y )+(1+r )  V(S ) ]}  t l ::s l t t er t t t+1 • t t-1 y t 
Let v be the conditional-on- continuation value of the bank: 
v = sup E[I/IO ,y  )+(1+rf1V(S ) I I =1 J . 
r t t t+1 t ' YtE 
which is time and state independent. If I equals 1 ,  shareholders t 
-min{N ,O} and get v, whilst if I equals zero, the bank is closed 
t t 
(20 )  
(21 )  
pay 
and 
the expression into big braces in (20 )  takes value zero. Shareholders 
choose to maintain the charter whenever the costs of recapitalization 
are not higher than v. So, the choice of I can be characterized as t 
follows: 




if I =1 and N �-v 
t - 1  t 
otherwise.  
(22)  
Taking into account the optimal choice of I ,  the expression for 
t 
ves ) is quite simple 
t 
min{N , O}+v 
t 
o 
if I =1 and N �-v 
t - 1 t 
otherwise. 
This expression can be used to compute E[V(S ) I I =11: 
t+1 t 
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E[V(S
t+1
) I It =1] = Prob[N =:0] ' V + Prob[ -v::N ::0] ' E[N +v l -v::N ::0] .  t+1 t+1 t+l t+l 
On the other hand, from the definition of I/J(I  , y  ) , 
t t 
E[I/JO ,y ) I I =l l  = (1+rf1Prob[N =:O ] ' E[N I N =:0] - K .  t t t t+1 t+1 t+1 t 
Thus, plugging the last two equations in (21 ) ,  we have 
V = sup 
y er 
t 
-1 {(1+r) Prob[N +v=:O] ' E[N +v l N +V=:O] - K }  
t+1 t+1 t+1 t • 
dropping the time indices and replacing N by R(CT)(D+K)-C(D) yields 
-1 
V = sup { (l+r) E[max{R(cr)(D+K)-C(D)+v,O}] - K} . 
yer 
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(23 )  
According to  (23) ,  the continuation value of the bank is that of 
investing K in a call option which is written not only on bank assets, 
R(CT) (D+K ) ,  but on the sum of bank assets and the continuation value of 
the bank, v. The amount of promised payments to depositors, C(D) ,  is the 
strike price of such option. 
Specifying R(CT) and C(D) as in section 2.4,  the value of this 
option can be computed following the same steps that led to my) : 
-1 V = sup rr(y,v) + ( 1+r) <P(y,v)v, 
yer 
where 
rr(y,v) = F(x) (D+K) - F(X-CT)Dl)+1 - K, 
<P(y,v) = F (X-CT),  
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The definitions of my, v) and 4?(y, v) are different from that of my) 
and 4?(y) ( in previous sections) because of the definition of x, that 
depends on v. Such dependence reflects that the value of the charter 
affects shareholders'  decision on continuation. 
The next result states that, at least for r>1), the optimal policies 
for the bank are risky policies in the sense that capital and asset 
regulations are binding. Moreover, since the result does not depend on 
the. values of k and iT, there are situations where these regulations are 
ineffective as a mean of inducing a safe policy. 
PROPOSITION 6: When recapitalization is allowed and r>1), the optimal 
policies for the bank are risky policies, whatever the values of k and 
CJ'. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
This result has to do with the form of the payoffs associated to 
one-period decisions. Under the simple closure rule of previous 
sections, shareholders win N+v when N is positive, and 0 otherwise. On 
the contrary, when recapitalization is allowed, 
when N +v is positive and 0 otherwise. 
t 
shareholders win N +v 
t 
Figure 4 represents, for both cases, the (discounted) payoffs to 
shareholders at the end of a period as a function of the (discounted) 
gross return on bank assets at that date. As can be seen, the difference 
is in the range [D1)+1_(1+rf1v, D1)+l ] of asset returns. Whilst with the 
first closure rule the bank is closed whenever R(cr)(D+K) is the interior 
of that interval, with the second rule shareholders recapitalize, paying 
D1)+l_R(cr)(D+K) to keep ( 1+rf1v. The non-convexity of the payoff in the 
first case explains shareholders'  aversion to risk when v is high 
enough. Conversely, the convexity of the payoff function in the second 
case induces risk-loving behavior, except when D1)+1_ (1+rf1v becomes 
negative. 
In practical terms, this section enters a caveat against a 
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FIGURE 4 
Shareholders' payoffs at the end of a period 
and the option to recapitalize 
- 1  ( l+r ) v 
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modification of the closure rule that might seem attractive for banking 
authorities. More concretely, once insol vency takes place, the 
supervisory agency may prefer the injection of capital by shareholders 
to its public involvement in the resolution of the crisis. These ex-post 
incentives to give to the shareholders an option to recapitalize may, 
however, go against the ex-ante need for inducing discipline with a 
(credible) threat of closure. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS. 
In this paper I analyze the prudential regulation of banks in a 
dynamic model of bank behavior which allows for bankruptcy and closure. 
The effectiveness of chartering and closure policies and their 
relationship with market power, capital and asset regulations and 
risk-taking can be formally settled. Given closure' policies and the 
provisions that exclude from business the promoters and managers of 
banks which become insolvent, the value of bank charters is an important 
endogenous component of bankruptcy costs to bankers and may constitute 
an incentive to adopt prudent decisions. 
Dynamic programming techniques allow us to obtain the 
conditional-on-surviving steady-state value of a bank, v*, together with 
the bank's optimal investment and financial policies. Comparative 
statics on v* provide insights into the fundamentals that influence the 
value of a chartered bank. They show that tighter capital and asset 
regulations (when binding) are associated to a lower v*, while smaller 
rates of interest and greater market power result in a higher V*. 
The equilibrium behavior of the bank depends crucially on V*. 
Because of non-convexities derived from the limited liability of 
bankers, optimal policies may be of two distinct extreme types: safe or 
risky. The risky type of policy dominates when v* is lower than a 
 critical value V, whereas the safe type of policy is optimal when v* is 
higher than V. Tough prudential regulation in general elicits the safe 
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policy, since high capital requirements and strong limitations on 
portfolio risk cause the value of a risky policy to be low, whilst they 
do not affect the value of a safe policy. Similarly, I have proved that 
high market power and low interest rates favor safe policies, that rest 
comparatively more on long-run profits and less on short-run 
opportunistic exploitation of the deposit insurance system. 
From the results, we can deduce that capital and asset regulation, 
on the one hand, and entry and closure policies, on the other, are 
alternative ways to preserve the solvency of banks. This trade-off 
should be taken into account in the design of banking regulation. 
Even though some empirical implications of this model seem to be 
somewhat extreme, several facts give support to the kind of bang-bang 
behavior predicted here. The recent widespread solvency problems of 'the 
savings and loan institutions in U.S. , for instance, appeared after a 
12 long period of well-functioning of the deposit insurance system. In an 
environment of increased competition (smaller 11) and financial 
deregulation (greater 0:), the higher real interest rates of the late 
seventies and early eighties (greater r) joined some regulatory mistakes 
to trigger off the debacle in the mid eighties: in the initial phases of 
the crisis, the regulator shored up book value net worth with a variety 
of accounting changes and reduced the minimum regulatory capital 
requirements (thereby producing a smaller k) .  The inadequate response of 
the regulator included also excessive forbearance and delay in closing 
or intervening thrifts in trouble. 
After a huge number of failures and enormous costs to tax-payers, 
many scholars and practitioners became interested in the topic and the 
U. S. government and banking authorities introduced reforms oriented to 
12 See U.S .  Department of the Treasury ( 1991) for a detailed description 
and Cole et a[ ( 1992) for empirical evidence. 
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restore prudent behavior, which had been predominant during the post-war 
period. The safety net built after the Great Depression has been 
partially based upon branching and geographical restrictions and 
interest rate ceilings, which acted as legal guarantees of market power. 
Financial innovation during the seventies and eighties irrevocably 
damaged, however, such conception of the banking business. Nowadays, 
disintermediation and largely unregulated non-bank financial 
intermediaries absorb a notable fraction of depositors' wealth, whereas 
modern information technology gives the banks' best debtors direct 
access to capital markets. As a consequence, regulatory reform faces the 
difficult task of restoring solvency in a necessarily more competitive 
context. This probably means that the future design of prudential 
regulation will have to rest more on asset and capital restrictions (as 
the Basle Accord of 1988 and the recent Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act confirm) ,  but it also ca�ls for prudence in 
the management of the chartering policy and the way to confront future 
deregulatory pressures. 
In a different context, after the Second Banking Directive of the 
European Community ( 1989) ,  European banks are able to provide their 
services throughout the Community with a single banking license from 
their home country. This rule raises potential threats to financial 
stability. For one thing, stronger competition and the erosion of 
charter values could be expected. For another, with banks potentially 
competing at a European level, domestic chartering policies become 
ineffective as a mean of controlling the degree of market power of 
banking institutions under the jurisdiction of home country authorities. 
Restoring their effectiveness would require coordination between 
national regulators. 
One cross-sectional implication of our model is that purely 
competitive banks are more likely to be risky than banks enjoying 
monopoly rents. If banks with different degrees of market power 
co-exist, a certain segmentation of the banking industry might take 
place. With U.S.  data, Marcus and Shaked ( 1984) found that most banks in 
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their sample were safe, whilst the riskiest 5 percent of the 
institutions accounted for virtually the entire value of FDIC 
liabilities. Although not only attributable to differences in market 
power, informal evidence shows that small recently created banks use to 
be more involved in negligence and fraud and are more inclined to go 
bankrupt during banking crisis. If this were the case, chartering 
policies should take into account the potential market power of each 
applicant bank as well as the effects of entry upon global competition 
in . the industry. In addition, it might be the case that supervisory 
practices should be sensitive to such segmentation, trying to exert 
control upon risk-taking by banks with less market power. 
A different but very related topic is the so-called too-big-to-fail 
problem, whose existence has been widely recognized (for a recent 
empirical statement, see Boyd and Gertler, 1993) .  The systematic 
reluctance of banking supervisors to close banks that are considered too 
big to fail actually means that the closure rule is not in force for 
such banks. All the disciplinary effect potentially related to the rents 
of bigger banks is lost. Paradoxically, the authorities confer a 
guarantee of survival upori big banks for fear of causing severe troubles 
to the financial system  and losing the value of the banks as going 
concerns. This guarantee makes the optimal policy of big banks to be 
risky and increases the costs of the deposit insurance system. Although 
preserving the value of the charter and avoiding the external costs of 
bankruptcy can make sense, rescue techniques should be designed so as to 
simultaneously discipline the bankers.  Regulators should be allowed to 
take over banks which failed the established solvency tests, and the 
final payment to shareholders should only be the liquidation value of 
the net worth ( intangible assets excluded) ,  whatever the size, 
going-concern value and final destination of the insolvent bank. 
Accordingly, discipline would be preserved, while if rescued banks had 
positive going-concern values (so they might have a future under the 
control of new shareholders) ,  the price paid for the institution by the 
successful bidders could partially or totally off -set the cost of the 
funds injected by the authorities to restore solvency. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Lemma 1. For all velR , the following properties are true: + 
( i )  H(v) is a continuous function. Let r be the set defined as 
r == {y=(D,K,CT)elR� I O�D�I, kD�K�K, and CT�(T}, 
where K>k is a high enough upper-bound to K. As I will show in section 
, 
4. 1 ,  an additional constraint such as K�K in the bank's problem would 
never be binding. Therefore, the following alternative definition for 
H(v) is possible: 
H(v) = sup { .IT(y) + ( 1+rf141(y)v },  
yer 
where r replaces r. As r is non-empty and compact and IT(y)+(1+rf141(y)v 
is continuous in y and v (see equations ( 11 )  and ( 13» , the Theorem of 
the Maximum ensures that H(v) is a continuous function (see Stokey and 
Lucas, 1989; p. 62) .  
Oi) H(v) is  an increasing function. Consider any v and v' such that 
v�v' , then 
H(v) = IT(y(v» +0+rf141(y(v) )v � IT(y(v))+(1+r )-141(y(v) )v' 
-1 � IT(y( v' ) )+0 +r) 41(y( v' ) lv' = H( v' ) .  
(iii) H(v) is positive. As v and 41(y) are positive, 0+rf141(y)v is 
positive, so that H(v)�supIT(y) .  But supIT(y) is always non-negative, 
since y =(O,O, O)er and IT(y )=0. o 0 
. 
(iv) The slope of H(v) is smaller than 1. Even though H(v) may be 
non-differentiable, I can prove that [H(v+h)-H(v) )/h is smaller than one 
for all velR and h>O. In fact, + 
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-1 -1 + SUp {(1+r) <l(y)h} :s H(v) + (1+r ) h. 
yer 
Thus, [H(v+h)-H(v) ]lh:S(1+rf1<l .o  
Proof of Lemma 2:  The bank seeks to  maximize: 
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G(y,v) = F(x)(D+K) - F(x-0")D7)+1 - K + ( 1+rf1F(x-0")v. (A1) 
where 
and 
8G 1)+1 -1 
80" 
= f(x-O")[D -(1+r) (x/O")v] 
-1 3 ( l+r) f(x-O')[Iog(1+k)-1)log(D) ]v/O' . 
(A2) 
(A3) 
If an interior solution for 0' existed, O<O'(v)<cr, (A2) would have to be 
zero, while (A3) would have to be negative. However, when (AZ) equals 
zero, the first term in (A3) is zero, whilst the second is always 
positive. Thus, (A3) is positive, contradicting the necessary second 
order condition for a maximum. Consequently, O"(v) may be either 0 or Ci, 
but not O<O'(v)<a-. Now, let us examine the choice of K when O"(v)=<r. From 
equation (Al l ,  the first order condition associated to an interior 
solution for K is: 
-1 v [F(x)-l]  + (l+r) f(x-O")O"(D+K) = 0, 
whereas, the necessary second order condition for a maximum is: 
f ( x )  
_ ( 1+rf1f(x-0")(xlO") v :s 0 O" ( D+K)  0"(D+K)2 
(A4) 
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From (A4) we can substitute I-F(x) for [O'( 1+r) (D+K) r1f(x-O')v in the 
left hand side of this inequality. Reordering, we arrive at: 
1 -F ( x )  ] 
0' ( D+ K ) 1- F ( x )  - x 
which is positive, since f(x)/[l-F(x) 1 is the hazard function of a 
standard normal random variable, that is greater than x for all x>O. 
Then, the second order condition does not hold and no interior solution 
for K can exist. If an optimal policy entails O'=<i, the optimal K is kD. 
The choice of O'� and an infinite K makes no sense because the value . of 
G(y,v) at (D,K,iT) when K tends to infinity, whatever D, can be attained 
with the same D, any finite K' and 0'=0. [J 
Proof of Lemma 3: The definition of D (v) in equation ( 17) can ' be 
R 





= argmax {J(O)+Q(D)},  
O�D � l  
- 11+1 -1 Q(D) = [ l-F(x-O') ] [D -(1+r) vl - ( l+k) [ 1-F(x) ]D. 
By definition, J(O) attains an unique global maximum at Ds'  is 
increasing at D<D and decreasing at D>D . On the other hand, as O'(v)=="U-, S S 
Lemma 3 implies that the capital requirement is binding. Then, G(y, v )  
-defined in (Al)- is  decreasing in K at K=kD (v ) :  
R 
(AS) 
This inequality will allow us to prove that Q(D) is increasing in D at 
D (v) :  
R 
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But, from (AS) ,  
Then, at D (v) ,  
R 
= ('l'}+l){[ l-F(x-IT) ]D (v)'l'}-(1+k) [ l-F(x)])  + (1+k) [ l-F(x) ] > O. 
R 
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(Notice that the term in braces is the value of deposit guarantees per 
unit of deposits (1+rf1E[max{-N,O}]lD, which is, by definition, 
positive) .  Now we can prove the result. Suppose, on the contrary, 
D (v)<D . Then both J(D) and Q(D) are increasing at D (v) whereas values 
R S R 
of D higher than D (v) are feasible. This contradicts the definition of 
R 
D (v) . o  
R 
Proof of Proposition 3: Using the same arguments as in Lemma 1, we can 
show that H (v) and H (v) have the same properties as H(v) ( i .e. they 
S R 
are continuous, increasing, positive and with a slope smaller than one) .  
Now, in order to  prove the result, I will show that H (v )  and H (v )  have 
S R 
an unique intersection at a point v>O. Equation (AS) shows the partial 
derivative of G(y, v) with respect to CT'. On the one hand, aGlaCT'>o at v=O, 
so CT'=O cannot be optimal for v=O and H (0 )<H (0) .  On the other hand, the 
S R 
sign of aGlaCT' is the sign of D'l'}+1_ (1+rf1(x/CT')v, which is maximum for 
"- -2 -1 D=l and K=kD. Then, there exists a value v=(1+r ) [ (1I2)+log( 1+k)lCT' ] 
such that aG/aCT'<o for all (D,K,<r)er and v>v (recall the definition of x 
"-
in equation ( 12».  Therefore, H (v» H (v) at any v>v. Thus, since H (v)  
S R S 
and H (v) are continuous, they intersect at least at one point v .  
R 
Moreover, the intersection is unique because the slope of H (v)  is 
S 
greater than that of H (v) for all v: �(y)=l>�(y' ) for any yeY (v) and 
R S 
y' eY (v) .  [Notice that either the envelope theorem ( in interior 
R 
Closure Rules, Market Power and Risk-Taking 148 
solutions ) or the fact that r does not depend on v ( in corner solutions) 
ensure dH Idv=aH 18v=cIi(y)=1 for any yeY (v) s s s 
any yeY (v) .  Therefore, H (v)�H (v) for v�v 
R S R  
and dH/dv=8H/av=cIi(y)<1 for 
and H (v)�H (v) for v�v, and 
S R 
the result followS. D  
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5: Lemma 4 (below) provides necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which a type of policy dominates the other 
after the change in a parameter. Intuitively, for the risky type of 
policy to dominate, the upward (downward) movement of H (v) at v* has to 
R 
be great (small) as compared with the upward (downward) movement of 
H (v) ;  otherwise, the safe type of policy dominates. s 
LEMMA 4: When v*=v and a small increase (decrease) in a parameter 
w=k,O:,r,1} takes place, the risky (safe) policies will dominate the safe 
(risky) policies if and only if the following condition holds: 
(AS)  
Otherwise, the safe (risky) policies will dominate the risky (safe) 
ones. 
Proof: This proof is based in a geometrical argument which hinges upon a 
linearization of H (v) and H (v)  around their intersection at v=v*. 
R S 
Figure Al depicts in augmented scale a case in which the vertical 
movement of H (v) and H (v) (as a result of a change in a parameter w) 
R S 
is such that indifference between risky policies in Y (v) and safe 
R 
policies in Y (v) remains. Graphically, the 
S 
situation is characterized 
by a sufficiently great vertical displacement of H (v) ,  AC, as compared 
R 
with the displacement of H (v) ,   Clearly AC=DF=DG-FG::[ 1-8H 18v]AG. 
S R 
Similarly, AB=DE= DG-EG::[1-8H 18v]AG. So, solving for AG in the second 
S 
equation and substituting back in the first, we get: 
- -1 -AC = [ l-aH lav] [ l-aH 18v]AB s R 
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-1 8H 18w = [1-8H 18v] [ l-8H 18v]8H 18w 
R S R S 
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If 8H law were greater than in the case depicted in Figure AI, the new 
R 
intersection of H (v) and H (v) would take place to the right of v and 
R S 
the risky policies in Y (v) would dominate the safe ones in Y (v) .  
R s 
Expression (8)  araises when 8H lav and aH lav are computed: 
S R 
[ 1-8H 18vr1[ 1-aH 18v] =  = 1+ 1-�(y ) 
S R l+r I+r r . 0  
Proof of Proposition 4: From the envelope theorem, the impact of r on 
the optimal risky 
diff erentiation leads 
and 
to 
safe policies can be 
8H lar=-( I+rf2�(y)v-
R 
ignored and simple 
and aH 18r=-( 1+rf2v-
S ' 
with yeY (v- ) ,  As �(y)<I, the term in square brackets of condition (AS)  
R 
is greater than one and condition (AS) holds: 
Proof of Proposition 5: As in the proof of Proposition 4, the elements 
in condition (AS) have to be computed. If D (v-) equals one (corner 
R 
solution) ,  
result is 
aH I aT/ equals 
R 
clearly true. 
solution) ,  we have: 
and 
zero, whereas 
If D (v-) is 
R 
aH laT/ is positive, 
s 
smaller than one 
aH laT/ = _[DT/+1UogD > O. 
S S S 
then the 
( interior 
Now, from the first order conditions associated to the optimal choice of 
D (v-) and D and the conditions H (v-)=v* and H (v*)=v*, the terms in 
R S R S 
brackets can be re-written, leading to: 
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and 
Then, recalling that 
follows. Cl 
8H 18il = - (lIil) [-l
r v*] logD . s +r s 
D (v*» D 
R S and applying Lemma 
151 
4, the result 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let G(y,v) be IT(y,v)+{1+rf1cI>(y,v)v and notice 
that the partial derivative of G(y, v) with respect to x is zero. Note 
also that, under Dil+1_(1+rf1v>0, 8G(y,v)l80" is positive and 8G(y,v)18K 
is negative so that the bank would adopt risky policies. On the 
contrary, under Dil+1-(1+r) 1v�O, we have F(x)=F(x-O")=cI>(y,v)=l, so .the 
bank would be safe and would choose a safe policy as those described in 
section 4.1 .  In order to prove the result, I will show that when r>il the 
best safe policies, yeY , entail Dil+1_{1+rf1v >0 so that they cannot be s s S 
-1 optimal. For any yeY , G(y,V)=[il/(1+il ) ]D +( 1+r) v, where 
1 s S D =[II(1+Tl ) ] 1 il . Then, the value v that solves v=G(y,v) for S S all yeY s 
can be computed: v =(l+r) (il/r) (l+ilfW(1+il>. We can easily check S 
condition Dil+1_(1+rf1v �o holds if and only if r�n. Cl S S 
that 
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